FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1194253-0

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June 10, 1941

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DECLASSIFIED BY~~ 2842 DMV/mc/JO
~~ON~~ 7-13-81

Assistant Director E. J. Connolley
New York, New York

Dear Sir:

Your attention is directed to Bureau letter dated April 30, 1941, wherein you were requested to interview Countess du Bourg de Bozas.

It does not appear that this matter has been given attention by your office. You are therefore requested to immediately notify the Bureau concerning the results of your interview with this individual.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

INDEXED

RECORDED

66-2542-3-48

66-2542-3-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 JUN 16 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FCH

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
JUN 10 1941
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

302 Dillingham Bldg.
Honolulu, T. H.
June 23, 1941

JHP:LT
62-65

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmD
mc/JC

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: MARITIME INDUSTRY
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent J. H. Polkinhorn, Honolulu, T. H., dated June 23, 1941, in the above-entitled case.

The following is the identification of contacts set forth in this report:

Contact T-1

Contact T-2

Contact T-3

b7D

Very truly yours,

R. L. Shivers
Special Agent in Charge

RECORDED

INDEXED

62-2542-3-49

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUN 25 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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(J) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. -- The Bureau in its national defense program and other activities realizes the vital necessity for establishing and maintaining thoroughly reliable and trustworthy mediums through which an expeditious and continuous flow of information concerning persons and organizations whose activities are inimical to the national defense will be available to the Bureau.

This Bulletin has as its purpose the clarification of any confusion that might exist in connection with this essential phase of the Bureau's work, and the instructions contained herein supersede all previous instructions which have been issued on this subject matter, with the exception of Section 8 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, which pertains to "Sources of Information, Confidential Informants, and Contacts."

For the purpose of clarification, confidential informants have been classified into the following three types:

1. CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS
2. CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS
3. CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

For further purposes of clarification, the following definitions are set forth, and hereafter the three types of confidential informants will be referred to as set forth in the preceding paragaph:

CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present criminal activities or affiliations are in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning criminals or any persons or organizations who have been, are, or anticipate violating general criminal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction, such as the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, the White Slave Traffic Act, the Bank Robbery, Kidnaping, Impersonation and Extortion Statutes, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present affiliations or associations are in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning any persons or organizations engaging in activities inimical to the national defense, such as information concerning sabotage, espionage, Neutrality Act violations, Selective Service violations, and all subversive activities including information concerning Communism, Nazism, Fascism, or any other so-called anti-American "isms."

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present affiliations or associations and their location in industrial facilities are

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 Dmc/Jmc/JTC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 21/3
FCIM II, 1-2.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 12-13-91

Confidential Draft in Personnel Defense

DECLASSIFIED BY Gdb/jmc
ON 4-22-94
93-1343

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in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning any persons or organizations engaging in activities inimical to the national defense, particularly in regard to the individual plants appearing on the Bureau's plant survey priority list, such as information concerning Communism, Nazism, Fascism, etc., and particularly concerning sabotage and espionage in the industrial plants appearing on the Bureau's priority list.

In view of the fact that the Bureau is charged with the responsibility of investigating violations of espionage, sabotage, and other violations affecting the national defense, too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the extreme necessity of establishing and maintaining, immediately, without any delay, reliable informants who will be in a position to inform the Bureau of any activities in which it is interested. The responsibility of investigating general violations of Federal Statutes over which this Bureau has investigative jurisdiction and national defense matters is definitely placed with each Special Agent in Charge, and it is his duty to be informed currently and immediately of all activities regarding violations over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction

Because of the peculiar nature of the Bureau's activities in regard to national defense matters, no CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT shall be established and maintained by any field office if such person or persons have been convicted of a felony.

In the event there is any individual who is presently carried in a field office as a CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT or a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT who has been convicted of a felony, the Bureau should be advised immediately and this individual should be removed as a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT or a CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT in that office. However, these instructions should not be construed to discourage the receipt of information regarding national defense matters from any individual, regardless of whether he has been convicted of a felony or not, who voluntarily offers such information to the Bureau. However, if such information is received by the field office and transmitted to the Bureau, the Bureau should be advised of the identity of the individual who voluntarily offered such information, and a general statement should be set out as to his character, reputation, reliability, and whether or not he has previously been convicted of a felony, in order that the Bureau might evaluate the information and be on notice as to the individual's character, reliability, and background.

PROGRESS REPORTS

In order that the Bureau may be currently advised of the activities of the various field offices in the development and maintenance of reliable CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and

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CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, it is suggested that effective immediately a report be submitted to the Bureau on the 20th of each month reflecting the total number of informants developed by each field office. Two separate and distinct reports should be furnished, namely:

A report on the total number of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, broken down into the following:

1. Number of informants regarding German or Nazi activities
2. Number of informants regarding Italian or Fascist activities
3. Number of informants regarding Communist activities
4. Number of informants regarding Japanese activities
5. Number of informants regarding activities of other nationalistic groups
6. Number of informants regarding general un-American activities not falling within the first five groups
7. Total number of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS developed by the field office (the total of items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)

A separate report should be submitted reflecting the total number of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed by the field office in the industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list, indicating

1. The name of the plant
2. Location of the plant
3. Total number of employees in the plant
4. Total number of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed in each plant
5. The grand total of all CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed in all industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list located in the field office district

ESTABLISHING RELIABILITY AND REPUTATION OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

Before an individual is designated and carried as a regular confidential informant in the field office, appropriate discreet inquiries should be made in order to secure information concerning his background, patriotism, reliability, integrity, and general reputation in the community. Information including data concerning personal history, past and present business connections, character, reputation, loyalty, trustworthiness, and any possible criminal

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record, should be submitted to the Bureau, together with the individual's full name - first name, middle name, and surname - together with the date and place of birth and the field office symbol number assigned to the individual, the latter information being desired by the Bureau in order that an accurate search may be made through the records of the Bureau concerning the individual. The above described information regarding such individuals should be submitted to the Bureau only in letter form. It should be definitely borne in mind that the full responsibility in the establishing of the fact whether an individual possesses a criminal record rests with the field.

If there are any individuals presently carried by a field office as CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who have not been appropriately investigated in line with the above instructions, and although their names have been submitted to the Bureau previously, appropriate inquiries should be made concerning them and the information should be submitted to the Bureau at once under confidential cover. Special concerted efforts should be made immediately so that the information mentioned above concerning each CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT carried in each field office will be transmitted to the Bureau immediately.

The above instructions regarding the investigation, selection, and submission of information to the Bureau concerning CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS does not apply to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS.

In view of the fact that the Bureau does not have jurisdiction over the investigation of intelligence matters on Army and Navy reservations, establishments, etc., it is not desired that CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS be established among Army or Navy personnel or in Army and Navy reservations, establishments, etc., unless the field office is specifically instructed to develop such informants in such establishments by the Bureau. The instructions contained in this paragraph do not apply to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS.

FIELD OFFICE ADMINISTRATION

That portion of Section 8 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations which pertains to "Sources of Information, Confidential Informants. and Contacts" shall remain unchanged but shall not apply to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS.

In addition to the file mentioned in Section 8 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, there shall be maintained in each field office a separate 3/5 card index file for CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and a separate 3/5 card index file for CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS. The file pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should be arranged alphabetically by state and alphabetically by plant behind

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each state, with the cards for each plant informant being filed alphabetically behind the card denoting the name of each plant.

The file pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS should be indexed as to the types of information which they are capable of furnishing the Bureau.

These files should be maintained in a confidential manner, and care should be exercised so that the identity of the informants will not be disclosed to persons outside the Bureau. The files pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should, however, be available to Special Agents, but should be locked when they are not in use. It is realized that with the large number of informants presently being developed in connection with national defense matters, it will be physically impossible for all of the index cards to be maintained in the exclusive possession and under the direct supervision of the Special Agent in Charge. These files may be maintained in drawers of the regular card index cabinet.

In the event there are any CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who should be contacted exclusively by a specified Agent of the field office, the card pertaining to such informants should be kept in the exclusive possession and under the personal supervision of the Special Agent in Charge. In such cases, however, a reference card should be placed in the general card index file as to the location of the informants and the type of information which they might be able to furnish, without disclosing their identity, in such a way that the Special Agent who might be desirous of using such informants might be placed on notice that such cards are under the exclusive personal supervision of the Special Agent in Charge.

The index cards, as in the past, should contain the names and addresses of the individuals, organizations and concerns with which they are connected, and an indication of the particular type of information which might be expected. In addition to this information, the cards should also indicate whether the informant is paid, and if so, the date when payment was first authorized, the amount of compensation, and whether payment is on a regular or intermittent basis. If the informant has in the past been designated by symbol, that symbol should also appear on the card.

If for any reason the services of an informant are discontinued, the card should remain in the appropriate file and a notation should appear on the card to the effect that the services of the informant have been discontinued as of a certain date. This procedure is necessary so that informants referred to by symbols in reports may be subsequently identified even though their services have been discontinued by the field office. When the services of an informant have been discontinued, the Bureau should be immediately notified so that a similar notation may be made on the

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index card which is maintained in the Bureau. When a symbol number is assigned to a particular informant, and the services of that informant are later discontinued, the symbol number should not be used again, but should be considered a dead number.

In order to facilitate the work of the Special Agents in the field offices, a cross-reference 3/5 card index file should be maintained of symbol numbers assigned to confidential informants, which cards should be maintained in a separate drawer and should be arranged numerically as to the symbol number assigned to the informant. This will assist the Special Agents in identifying confidential informants who are referred to in reports and other serials by symbol number only.

When any correspondence is addressed to the Bureau concerning informants, it should clearly designate whether the communication is in reference to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, and information concerning only one of the three types of informant should be contained in any one communication. In other words, one communication to the Bureau should not set forth information concerning both CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and PLANT INFORMANTS, etc.

REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE CONTAINING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY INFORMANTS

In the past, certain field offices have followed the practice of merely forwarding to the Bureau information or reports furnished by confidential informants without indicating what action is contemplated by the field in connection therewith, and in some cases have not retained a copy of the reports of the confidential informants. In the future, cover letters transmitting such information should specifically indicate what action is contemplated by the field office relative to each item contained therein. If informants furnish reports concerning violations and individuals, which information is not related, these should be transmitted to the Bureau by separate cover letters, so that the information may be appropriately handled in the Files Section of the Bureau.

All communications addressed to the Bureau concerning confidential informants should be transmitted under confidential cover. The identity of confidential informants who have furnished information to the field office, which information is included in reports which will be transmitted to agencies outside the Bureau, should not be revealed in the reports, but reference should be made to the informants by means of the field office symbols assigned to them. The Bureau will have been advised previously of these symbols if the individuals are carried as regular CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, and the Bureau will be in a position to quickly

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ascertain from its records the identities of the individuals who furnished the information.

In the case of information furnished the field office by an individual who is not carried as a regular CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANT, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT, and whose identity should not be made known to persons outside the Bureau, the identity of such individual should not be disclosed in reports which will be transmitted to agencies outside the Bureau. In such cases, it will be necessary for the individual to be given a temporary symbol, and the first letter of this symbol should be the letter "T." The Bureau of course in these cases must be advised by a separate communication marked "Confidential," reflecting the identity of such individuals referred to in reports.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS shall not be developed through contact with the plant managements. All CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS in the future shall be developed without the knowledge of such officials and through direct contacts with the prospective informants by the Agents of the field offices. It is only necessary to develop CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS in those plants which appear on the Bureau's plant survey priority list, and the development of a necessary number of informants in any given plant should not be delayed awaiting the actual survey of the facility. This instruction, however, should not be construed to discourage the development of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS in plants and in other establishments not listed on the Bureau's plant survey priority list.

In order that the Bureau's records regarding CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS might be kept in a current status, the field office should transmit to the Bureau immediately the complete background information required as hereinbefore stated concerning the prospective informant after he has been interviewed and has agreed to cooperate with the field office. This information should not be withheld by the field office until like information has been developed concerning each and every CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT in the field office district.

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should be specifically advised that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships, and they should be informed that the Bureau is desirous of securing information concerning possible espionage or sabotage, or any information which would indicate a violation of Federal Statutes within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction, or which would be of interest to the Bureau in connection with the safeguarding of the internal security of the United States. A record should be made in each field office reflecting that each CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT developed has been so specifically advised. The Bureau wishes that

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this matter be clearly pointed out to the prospective CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS so that there will be no misunderstanding regarding the Bureau's position in regard to this matter.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

A. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

Individuals contacted in connection with the Bureau's American Legion program are purely sources of information, and they should not be referred to as confidential informants or given symbols as such until they have assumed the full status of a confidential informant of one or more of the three classifications mentioned hereinbefore, and are reporting regularly to your office concerning matters which pertain to the national defense generally or are of interest to your office in connection with criminal investigations. It is possible of course that certain of the individuals interviewed in connection with that program may later be developed to the point where they may be considered as confidential informants in one or more of the three aforementioned classifications. In the event they are developed to the point where they could logically be termed CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, the Bureau should be furnished the complete background information required for such confidential informants, together with appropriate symbols, in order that these individuals may be identified by the Bureau in future communications.

It is not believed, however, that all of the individuals so contacted in connection with the American Legion program can be considered as confidential informants, and extreme care should be exercised in order that they shall not be classified as confidential informants until they have been established as such.

Each field office shall maintain a 3/5 card index file containing the names of individuals contacted in connection with the Bureau's American Legion program, and these cards should be maintained in a separate and distinct drawer in order to preclude confusion. American Legion contacts should not be given permanent symbols.

B. SOURCES OF INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN PLANTS ON PRIORITY LIST

In addition to the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who will include laborers and others who are working in the assembly lines, machine shops, and other productive areas of the plant, it is also deemed urgent that sources of information consisting of officials and other persons serving in supervisory or administrative capacities at the plants, be developed so that they may assist in advising the

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Bureau of any evidences of violations of the National Defense Statutes. However, the distinction between the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and sources of information in plants should continually be borne in mind, and individuals such as presidents, vice presidents, secretaries and treasurers of plants, plant protection officials, and others who are not desirous of their identity being kept in confidence when reporting information to the Bureau, should be considered only as sources of information, and should not under any circumstances be listed as CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS. The identity of such individuals falling into the category of sources of information in plants should not be transmitted to the Bureau except when the field office reports information furnished by such sources of information, and it is not necessary that the background information, including data concerning character, reputation, integrity, and criminal records be submitted to the Bureau as is required in the case of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, as the Bureau does not desire to maintain records at the Seat of Government concerning the identity of the various sources of information developed in the field.

C. SOURCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMATION OTHER THAN SOURCES OF INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN PLANTS

Here again, as explained in the preceding subsection, a definite distinction should be made between sources of information in national defense matters and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, and as related before, it is not necessary for the identity of such national defense sources of information to be furnished to the Bureau; nor is it necessary for background information, including character, reputation, integrity, and criminal records to be furnished to the Bureau. For your assistance in distinguishing between CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and National defense sources of information, it might be well to point out that a member of the Communist Party who is furnishing information regarding the activities of the Communist Party and who does not desire under any circumstances that his identity or relation with the Bureau be generally known, should be considered as a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT, whereas on the other hand a president of a local bank who in the course of his usual business receives information regarding the Communist Party, but who does not desire that his identity be concealed and who does not care whether any person knows that he furnished information to the Bureau, should be considered as a source of information.

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In the event representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence or Military Intelligence Division in the various field office districts should request information concerning the total number of confidential plant informants maintained by the Bureau in industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list, this information should be furnished to those agencies. However,

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the identities of the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should under no circumstances be disclosed to those agencies without prior Bureau authority.

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In order that the Bureau might benefit to the fullest extent by the establishment of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, each field office should take the necessary steps to maintain proper contact with such informants in order to maintain the interest of the informant in his capacity as a Bureau informant, and in order to develop such individuals into better mediums of information.

The Special Agents in Charge will be held responsible for the proper maintenance of contact with CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

It is of course impossible to establish any given set of rules or fixed methods of procedure in the development of confidential informants. It is believed that the success of this important work will depend entirely upon the inititative of the individual Agents and Special Agents in Charge.

It is important and absolutely necessary that Agents maintain frequent contact with their confidential informants. This is necessary not only to establish in those individuals complete confidence in the Agent but also to impress upon the individuals the importance of furnishing information to the Agent. Each Agent in his daily contacts and interviews should bear in mind that every individual he interviews is a potential informant. If he contacts that individual on more than one occasion and receives valuable information, in other words if he assures himself that the individual is "able to produce," he should make appropriate inquiry concerning the individual's background and reputation and if thereafter deemed advisable, he should contact that individual relative to furnishing information on a regular basis to that Agent or other Agents of the office.

Each individual interviewed in this connection should be assured that any information furnished by him will be maintained in strictest confidence and will be used only for official purposes in connection with the Bureau's work. He should also be assured that his identity as a confidential informant will be closely guarded by the Bureau. Particularly in connection with National Defense matters, it should be a comparatively easy matter to convince individuals that they should cooperate with the Bureau by appealing to their patriotism and sense of loyalty to the Government.

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In order to secure first hand information concerning various subversive movements which may affect the Internal Security of the

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United States, it is necessary that informants be developed within the membership of those groups. There are always those individuals who, because of mercenary reasons, grudges against the groups, or because of their patriotism and loyalty to the Government, will be willing to keep Agents advised of the groups' activities and plans for future activity.

Care should be exercised in the development of this particular type of informant and no information should be divulged concerning any of the Bureau's projects or confidential undertakings. Informants of this type should not be approached until careful discreet inquiry has been made concerning their general background and reputation. In other words, it should be definitely ascertained that these individuals are no longer loyal to the group with which they are affiliated and that they have some definite reason for cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

If it is found necessary to reimburse certain informants for their expenses or services, and it is believed that the information furnished by these informants is of sufficient value to warrant regular payments, you are authorized to expend an amount not to exceed $10 per month or $2.50 per week without prior Bureau authority. In every instance where payments exceed this amount, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. Complete background information should be submitted to the Bureau with a definite recommendation by the Special Agent in Charge as to the desirability of employing any informant who is to receive more than $10 per month.

It is the definite responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to closely supervise the activities of all informants under his supervision. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, the Special Agent in Charge should definitely assure himself that full value is being received.

If at any time it appears that the information produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau should be promptly advised. Each informant should distinctly understand that he is not to represent himself as having any connection with the Bureau, and further that any information obtained by him should be secured through his own initiative.

It should also be impressed upon all informants that they should furnish information exclusively to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They should understand that the information obtained by them is of a confidential nature, and therefore should be furnished only to the Governmental agency which has been authorized by the President to accept this type of information.

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It is important for each field office to have appropriate coverage in each industrial plant which appears on the priority lists which have been furnished to the Bureau by the Army and Navy and in addition to these CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS every field

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office should exert every possible effort to develop reliable individuals who are in a position to report information concerning possible sabotage or espionage attempts, delay in ship movements, ship fires, and activities on the part of various nationalistic groups.

It is also important that contacts be established to secure information concerning the travel and destination of foreign agents and possible couriers to and from the United States as well as within the continental limits of the United States. Arrangements should also be made to receive advice concerning unusual shipments to and from foreign countries, as well as unusual mail or baggage arriving or leaving the United States. Those offices located on the East or West Coasts should establish selected informants within seamen's groups; shipping company employees; shipping company officers and management; stokers and firemen; longshoremen; dock and wharf workers; draymen; transfer, freight, and taxi drivers; radio operators on ship and shore; scaling company employees; and with the Maritime Commission, commerce and other inspection services. (U)

In connection with air travel, you should develop contacts to keep your office advised of foreign travel, both incoming and outgoing. All ships entering and leaving the United States should be covered. German, Japanese, Italian and Russian passengers should be ascertained from passenger lists and a report made as to their destinations, hotel addresses, passports and visas, and baggage. When such passengers are aliens, the Bureau should be advised by teletype of pertinent facts if they are departing from the United States. If they are entering the United States, the Bureau and the field office of destination should be advised by teletype, including any recommended action. (U)

Arrangements should also be made so that the taking of photographs of locations possibly connected with the National Defense, and other suspicious actions by foreigners and other individuals, will be reported to the field office.

As of possible assistance to the various Field Offices in developing a large variety of confidential informants, the following sources, among others, are suggested:

Telephone companies
Telegraph companies
Beer taverns
Airport managers
Clubs and dance halls frequented by servicemen or seamen
Radio stations
Tunnel, bridge and port police
Banks
Electricians
Sanitation and Health Inspectors

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Munitions and aircraft plants
Patriotic union leaders
Taxicab companies
Chinatown leaders
National Guard
American Legion
Transportation and shipping company police
Light, water, and power companies
Plant police
Superintendents of mail carriers
Credit Associations and Agencies
Fire Departments
Organizations or groups of any kind with large memberships
Hotels
Real Estate agencies
Restaurants
Rental Agencies

It should also be borne in mind that the quality and type of informant developed is far more important than the quantity. Emphasis must be placed on the development of informants who can furnish reliable and accurate information.

Another suggestion which appears to possess considerable merit is that there be recorded in each field division as sources of information friends or associates of Special Agents, who because of the nature of their employment might be in a position to furnish valuable information in the present emergency. For example, persons associated with or employed in the banking business, the brokerage business, and in other types of business having a general contact with the public, might well be informed by Special Agents who are related to or associated with them of the types of information which the Bureau is desirous of securing at this time.

The Bureau has recently furnished each field office with, (1) "List of Important Plants having Contracts with the British Purchasing Commission," and (2) a list of "Civilian Constructed and Operated Plants." It is desired that these two lists be considered by you as a part of the Bureau's priority list in so far as the development of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS is concerned, and the instructions contained hereinbefore apply equally to these two lists.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-10-2013
F65M72K70

ral Bureau of Investigation
States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

FCH:RMB

June 16, 1941

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 [illegible]
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

There is attached hereto a statistical tabulation of the status of the Bureau's program of developing Confidential National Defense Informants. This table is set up according to Field Offices.

It will be noted that some Field Offices have a very few informants while others have a very large number. For instance, the Boston Office reports a total of 1,302 Confidential National Defense Informants, while an office such as New York reports only a total of 93 informants. It would appear that Boston is listing a great number of persons as Confidential National Defense Informants who should probably be classified as sources of information, and this matter has been brought to the attention of the Boston Office in order that it might be definitely ascertained that all of the 1,302 informants are actually productive informants of the Bureau. Other offices with unusually large numbers of informants have likewise had this matter called to their attention, while those offices which have relatively few informants have been followed up to secure additional productive informants.

All offices listed have been followed up on this matter in the last few days at which time it was pointed out to them the absolute necessity for the development of adequate coverage of reliable, productive confidential informants, and these offices will be continually followed up on this matter in order that this program of the Bureau might be handled properly in the field, and so that the Bureau will be currently advised of matters pertaining to German, Italian, Japanese, Communist and general un-American activities.

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY SP7 MAC 302
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2-2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91
9-15-81

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66-2542-3-50
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
7 JUN 25 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CH-26

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2845 PMC
MC/JC

TAMM
FOXWORTH
CHF. CLERK
HARBO
FIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

AS OF JUNE 5, 1941

DECLASSIFIED BY Sobbja / [illegible]
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

CONFIDENTIAL

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 PMU / MCJC

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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	JAPANESE	COMMUNIST	OTHER NATIONALITIES	UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES	TOTAL NUMBER OF INFORMANTS
Albany	12	11	0	12	3	43	81
Atlanta	12	1	1	16	0	53	83
Baltimore	4	3	0	16	0	0	23
Birmingham	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
Boston	34	117	14	39	447	651	1302
Buffalo	20	10	2	13	1	11	57
Butte	25	6	6	24	10	0	71
Charlotte	7	4	4	10	2	114	141
Chicago	8	5	4	26	2	1	46
Cincinnati	18	3	0	6	0	5	32
Cleveland	19	20	2	24	2	36	103
Dallas	1	1	1	10	3	3	19
Denver	3	6	4	11	4	6	34
Des Moines	8	4	0	11	2	7	32
Detroit	29	9	1	42	37	172	290
El Paso	16	3	2	8	21	86	136
Grand Rapids	21	12	7	27	17	49	133
Honolulu	9	4	66	6	7	88	180
Houston	9	3	0	20	5	8	45
Huntington	4	7	0	8	0	23	42

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	JAPANESE	COMMUNIST	OTHER NATIONALITIES	UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES	TOTAL NUMBER OF INFORMANTS
Indianapolis	5	2	1	15	2	6	31
Juneau	0	1	0	5	0	150	156
Kansas City	35	6	1	18	0	26	86
Knoxville	0	0	1	5	0	0	6
Little Rock	6	4	1	10	0	0	21
Los Angeles	58	40	74	94	11	246	523
Louisville	7	3	0	7	0	7	24
Memphis	7	2	0	2	0	9	20
Miami	43	40	40	43	0	0	166
Milwaukee	17	1	1	10	0	34	63
Newark	15	14	0	5	0	38	72
New Haven	12	11	1	10	2	25	61
New Orleans	4	2	1	7	0	30	44
New York	54	9	2	19	6	3	93
Oklahoma City	20	0	2	13	3	143	181
Omaha	8	4	1	19	2	15	49
Philadelphia	5	13	0	9	0	7	34
Phoenix	28	12	21	12	38	155	266
Pittsburgh	7	2	0	9	1	3	22
Portland	21	7	9	24	4	112	177

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	JAPANESE	COMMUNIST	OTHER NATIONALITIES	UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES	TOTAL NUMBER OF INFORMANTS
Richmond	7	3	0	5	0	64	79
St. Louis	17	10	3	7	5	14	56
St. Paul	105	5	2	70	11	468	661
Salt Lake City	12	1	11	10	2	110	146
San Antonio	11	2	0	7	6	126	152
San Diego	12	6	5	6	13	21	63
San Francisco	24	11	10	33	9	101	188
San Juan	14	2	1	4	1	59	81
Savannah	23	4	0	39	2	97	165
Seattle	17	5	18	20	2	15	77
Sioux Falls	24	2	2	16	2	19	65
Springfield	24	17	1	29	12	93	176
Washington	5	1	3	15	3	80	107

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

June 24, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Karbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

PEF:ML

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The National Defense Conference, at which were present Messrs. Tolson, Gurnea, Carson, Collier and Foxworth, considered the attached bulletin to the field requesting that the Bureau be advised not later than July 1, 1941 the number of confidential national defense informants developed who are actually members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any of the other front organizations whose activities are known to be inimical to the welfare of this government.

Those in attendance were unanimously in favor of the issuance of the bulletin.

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/sc

RECORDED

66-2542-3-50X

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

FCH:RMB

June 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

There is attached herewith a proposed letter to all Special Agents in Charge for approval. A concerted effort is being made by the Plant Survey Section at the present time to secure additional reliable, productive informants, and it is believed that all Field Offices should have individuals as informants who are actually members of the Communist Party and the many front organizations whose activities have been found to be subversive.

It is believed that the attached letter will serve a psychological effect on the Field at the present time, and it is also contemplated that when this information is received that each Field Office will be followed up in order to encourage immediate development of informants in these organizations.

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 [illegible]
MC/JC

RECORDED 66-2542-3-50X
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 JUL 21 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOXWORTH

New Haven, Connecticut
June 30, 1941

LLM:WN
100-1335

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: MILAN M. YARNSEN
INTERNAL SECURITY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

Dear Sir:

This is to advise that the confidential informant referred to in the report of Special Agent L. L. MEUNIER, dated at New Haven, Connecticut, June 30, 1941, in instant matter is [redacted] Hartford, Connecticut.

The other informants mentioned are police [redacted]

b7D

For the information of the Bureau, [redacted] furnished the information contained in this report in all confidence to Agent MEUNIER and under no circumstances should the New Haven Field Division request assistance in this investigation from the chief of police in Hartford, since then there would be a possibility that the source of this confidential information would be disclosed.

For the further information of the Bureau, it is noted that Chief KALLINSKY [redacted] are at swords point and do not trust one another.

RECORDED
INDEXED

Very truly yours, 66-2542-3451

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUL 10 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

J. J. McGuire
Special Agent in Charge

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - G

FIVE HENDON

ORIGINAL FILED IN

CH-2

July 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
CARSON
COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
MURPHY
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 PMJ
mcjc

RE: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS
CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS
CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

It has been noted from the letters being received at the Bureau that the correct captions concerning the above are not being set forth as desired and explained in Bureau Bulletin No. 17, dated May 15, 1941.

I wish to make it definitely understood that in the future you should distinguish in the captions of your letters the types of informants referred to in the communications, that is, whether they are confidential national defense informants, confidential plant informants, or confidential general investigative informants.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
RECEIVED
MAILED
★ JUL 11 1941 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

July 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
CARSON
COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
MURPHY
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mcl/JC

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

It is desired that you immediately advise the Bureau of the number of Confidential National Defense Informants which you have developed in your district who are actually members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any of the other front organizations whose activities are known to be inimical to the welfare of the Government.

It is desired that the Bureau be advised in regard to this not later than July 10, 1941.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JUL 2 1941 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECORDED 66-2542-3-5 OX July 2, 1941

SAC	ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
	BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
	BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BOSTON	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BUTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	CHARLOTTE	JACKSON	NEW YORK (E.J. Connelley)	SAN JUAN
	CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SIOUX FALLS
	DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

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It is desired that the Bureau be advised in regard to this not later than July 10, 1941.

Very truly yours,

J. Ed. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 28422 mD/mc/JC

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JUL 2 1941 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

July 11, 1941

SAC

ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
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BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
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CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SEATTLE
CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SIOUX FALLS
DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

RE: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS
CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS
CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

It has been noted from the letters being received at the Bureau that the correct captions concerning the above are not being set forth as desired and explained in Bureau Bulletin No. 17, dated May 15, 1941.

I wish to make it definitely understood that in the future you should distinguish in the captions of your letters the types of informants referred to in the communications, that is, whether they are confidential national defense informants, confidential plant informants, or confidential general investigative informants.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-22-81 BY 2342 PMV

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JUL 11 1941 ★
P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

66-2542-452

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Memphis, Tennessee
July 9, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy
FILES

EEK:SSN

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 ON 7-13-81

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS-

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated June 11, 1941 concerning a program for the development of confidential informants and requesting that there be forwarded to the Bureau memoranda concerning the development of confidential informants as supplied from the experiences had by Special Agents in this office engaged in this work.

In this connection, there are being transmitted to the Bureau herewith memoranda furnished by Special Agent JOHN W. CORE, Special Agent (A) G. H. ERWIN and Special Agent L. E. KINGMAN.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Kuhnel

E. E. KUHNEL
Special Agent in Charge

Enclosures (3)

RECORDED 66-2515-3-53
INDEXED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUL 18 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CH-15

EX-18

Memphis, Tennessee
July 3, 1941

LEK:MLV

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE:

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

In response to your memorandum of June 26, 1941, I am furnishing the following reflections and observations applicable to the development of confidential informants.

The impressions I have gained from fifteen years' experience in the Bureau's work, is that a very poor way to develop confidential informants is to conduct any intensive drive for that purpose. It has also been my experience, that for confidential informants to be of value, they should be cultivated for a period of time and should be very well known before it is determined whether or not they are of any value. It is also my belief that confidential informants of the type needed in the Bureau work can only be developed by special agents with some background of experience and also with some period of service in the district in which they are working.

I have known of persons to be referred as confidential informants by special agents who lack experience and who may have recently come into a certain district office. First impressions of an informant may have been good, and later this informant would prove to be merely a chiseler and one in whom no confidence could be placed, and whose efforts were valueless. I have had some experience in various field offices where an informant would be developed by a new agent, or an agent recently transferred to a district, and would be paid sums of money for his alleged services, who was well known to the older agent as a fourflusher and chiseler, but whose services had been utilized for some time before the alleged informant was brought to the attention of the older agent.

I have always hesitated to allow my first impressions of a person whom I have just met to control me in recommending him as a confidential informant, because these first impressions may afterwards undergo a radical change with acquaintance.

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

66-2542-3-53

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

I believe that any person who is going to be depended upon to furnish confidential information to the Bureau should be checked and double checked, and should be well known for a period of time before he is placed on any list as a dependable confidential informant.

I have found that the confidential informant who furnishes the most information of value is usually one who can only be contacted by some one agent with whom he has formed an acquaintance and in whom he has confidence. The agent, in turn, knows and has confidence in this informant. Some of our most important criminal cases have been solved through the help of confidential informants, and this bears out the above statement. I have found confidential informants to be very reluctant to have any contact with more than one special agent, and they resent being seen by agents who are strangers to them. This theory is borne out further in the practice of members of police departments, who each have their own individual informants. I do not believe the Bureau should discourage any special agent from developing confidential informants who will only work for and develop information for the one agent with whom they are acquainted. I believe that any person who will furnish information to any agent or officer who contacts him should be considered as a general source of information, and that the term confidential informant should be applied only to those who are willing to work for and furnish information for not more than one or two special agents.

I do not have much confidence in a person who will freely and openly discuss a confidential matter with strangers, even though they might be special agents. I have a feeling about this sort of person that he would discuss the same type of information with any other stranger that would question him about any given subject.

Upon going into any new office or territory with which I am unfamiliar, I am hesitant to recommend any one as a confidential informant until I have had many contacts with him and I am completely satisfied that he is dependable.

I believe in testing them out for a while before considering them in such a capacity.

I believe that the work of developing confidential informants in each field office should be left largely to the experienced agents in that office, and to such special agents who have worked in that territory for at least one year or more. I believe that each field office now has in its confidential informant files the names of many persons developed by new agents, who are utterly useless and are not dependable, and who should not be given the feeling that they are in any way associated with special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I believe that the development of such persons has been due to the intensive drive that each office has put on, in which agents in charge have demanded that each agent attached to the office furnish some definite number of confidential informants prior to a certain date. They have accumulated a good number of names, but very few persons that I would consider to be confidential informants.

To sum up my reflections, I would state that I believe the Bureau should strive to have a constant improvement in quality of confidential informants, rather than quantity.

Respectfully submitted,

L. E. KINGMAN
Special Agent

Memphis, Tennessee
July 7, 1941

JWC:SSN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

With reference to your memorandum of June 26, 1941, I am submitting the following observations relative to the development of confidential informants:

At the outset, it appears to me that most Agents recently in the service, but more particularly Agents who have been in the service for many years, are taking the attitude that the offices are not at the present time developing confidential informants of any real value. In this connection it is the writer's observation that the services of confidential informants at present are entirely different from those used in general criminal investigative work in past years and that although the term "confidential informant" may be a misnomer in some instances that it should be impressed on Agents throughout the field that these persons are invaluable, and though not confidential informants in the sense used a few years ago, must be developed with complete information regarding them in order that the Bureau may know with whom various offices are dealing.

At the regular weekly conference of newly-appointed Agents, the writer, with your authorization, scheduled a supposititious interview of a person coming to the office to offer his services to the Bureau. It appeared that this might present workable suggestions and observations. It might be noted that during this interview, the Agent meeting the person offering his services had a tendency to "jump at him." Immediately upon the individual's offering his services, the Agent had a tendency to go into a theoretical discussion of the usage of confidential informants by the office, outlining the ways in which this office might keep an individual's identity confidential; however, there was a complete failure to tell the would-be informant of the nature

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

of the information desired by the Bureau. It was also observed at this time that the Agent endea vored to obtain personal history data by direct questioning and in such a manner as to suggest to the informant that he was being made the subject of an investigation.

It is the writer's belief that during the first interview with a person coming to the office to offer his services, whether he appears in the office to enter an application and is found unqualified, but useful as an informant, or if he is in private business and wants to furnish information to the office as a result of his business connections, he certainly should not at that time be led to believe that he is to be made the subject of any inquiry whatsoever. Any questions directed toward his personal history, with a view to determining his value as an informant, should be designed to point out to him the manner in which his work and contacts may result in material of value to the Bureau. In other words, personal data should be brought out during the course of a general conversation rather than by direct questions. Although he should be assured that his identity will not be disclosed at any time, there does not appear to be any reason whatsoever in going into the manner in which this office and the Bureau keeps his identity concealed.

good

The detective complex informant, who is interested in a number in place of his identity, might of course be given his number after his value is established.

The most important one item in handling informants in the writer's opinion is, at the very first opportunity that is presented, to clearly bring to the attention of the informant that he will have no value if his identity becomes known to anyone whatsoever. It has been this Agent's practice, and it is believed it should be the general practice, to outline to every informant the provisions of the Impersonation Statute. In every instance it is made clear to him that not only will his value be impaired by anyone knowing that he is furnishing information to the Bureau, but that also, if he represents himself to have any official connection with the Bureau, every investigative effort will be directed with a view to his prosecution.

good

good

During the course of the first interview, an individual should be apprized of the type of information that the office desires. Subversive activities and the methods of subversive groups may be discussed generally. Matters he might observe in his business or social life should be brought to his attention. This discussion should not be on any high-sounding or technical line but should give the person a concrete and definite idea of how he may be of assistance.

good

Caution against conducting an investigation or in any way advising members of family, friends or otherwise of any association or connection with the Bureau should be repeated at every opportunity during the interview, and a half dozen or more times is not excessive in this Agent's opinion.

I have been unable to see any objection to advising a would-be informant at the very outset that he might be used on a paid basis if it is clearly pointed out that he will only be paid for value received. It should be clearly indicated to him that he will only be paid on a salary basis after he has proven himself to be of definite worth.

good

All contacts with informants or would-be informants should of course bring out the fact that they, as well as representatives of the Bureau, are primarily interested in preserving and defending the United States. In most instances offer of payment should be avoided because the same amount of assistance can be obtained without the cash stipend.

good

In later contacts with an informant or would-be informant, further personal history data may either be developed from him by direct questioning or by general conversation, depending on the man's position and his personal characteristics as observed by the Agent handling him. Naturally no definite rules can be suggested in handling these contacts.

good

It is believed that as nearly as possible the use of an informant should be made available to the entire office, but as a practical matter it is observed that more success will be obtained in all instances if one informant is limited to being contacted by no more than two or three Agents who may make

the informant acquainted with other Agents upon transfer. It is not believed that any informant, however close to the Bureau and to a particular office, should be "willy-nilly" approached by every Agent in the division.

It has all too often occurred that an Agent is taken in by a person who is only anxious to pick up a few dollars on the side. Every Agent who has been in the Bureau for any length of time has personally been taken in by one or more of these chisel-ers. It appears that it would be a good policy to never put out funds, with possible rare exceptions, until information has actually been furnished, and its accuracy checked. Further, in the handling of informants it has been observed that some Agents, regardless of an individual's status in the community and known excellent character and reputation, follow the policy of telling him nothing and giving him no incentive to continue his endeavors. It appears obvious to the writer that in a great many instances an informant can be told generally the outcome of matters on which he has acted as an informant in such a way that he will be given an incentive toward further work but at the same time not be given any information which would in any way jeopardize the Bureau's position.

good

Some Agents might be led to divulge valuable information to the great embarrassment not only of themselves but the Bureau as well. Any fact imparted to an informant may later be coupled with his own fiction and made to sound plausible.

I advised all Agents at a recent conference of the position I would take, when acting as Special Agent in Charge in your absence, in regard to any Agent who divulged confidential information to unauthorized persons. I expressed the position that dismissal with prejudice would be recommended in such cases. The discussion particularly concerned the fact that persons of rather well established Nazi sympathies have been to the office purporting to offer assistance, and particular emphasis was therefore placed on the topic. I expressed a similar attitude regarding excessive talking in restaurats or public places concerning Bureau matters, or in reading serials on streetcars, etc., where unauthorized persons would have an opportunity to obtain confidential information. The writer feels very strongly on these sub-

jects and does not believe that too much emphasis can be placed upon them, particularly when national defense items are concerned.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN W. CORE
Special Agent.

Memphis, Tennessee
July 8, 1941

GHE:MLV

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE:

Reference is made to your memorandum dated June 26, 1941, requesting that a memorandum be prepared concerning the development of confidential informants.

It is a well-known and recognized fact that confidential informants are developed in one of three ways, namely:

1. Through friendship, acquaintanceship, or in return for some favor granted in the past;

2. By buying information;

3. By having the confidential informant under obligation to you.

Confidential informants developed by the friendship method are not developed overnight, but over a long period of time. These informants, when properly developed and contacted, can and will furnish information of value to an office. These individuals are the type which can be contacted in most instances by only one man in the office. They are not individuals who will divulge information to any and every one. Although their names are placed as confidential informants in the office, they have to be contacted discreetly and not promiscuously by all agents. The type of information furnished by these informants is of much value and to obtain this information, they must be handled carefully.

The second type of confidential informant can be obtained by any one in the office, due to the fact that they furnish information strictly for pecuniary gain. These people can be approached by almost any agent in the office at any time and information gained.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE:

The third type of confidential informant is the type generally used by the police department, due to the fact that he has violated some minor ordnance or law, and they hold this over his head, somewhat like a whip to make him produce information they desire. This method is not used by Bureau employees, and the only time that confidential informants can be developed by a special agent along that line is to place them under imaginary obligation.

It is the opinion of the writer that mass drives to obtain confidential informants are of little value, because the quality of the confidential informants obtained are of practically no value. In the opinion of the writer, it is better to develop confidential informants for quality and not quantity. At the present time, due to the National Defense Program now in progress, an agent may be able to develop confidential informants through patriotism and loyalty to the Government, but this requires a great deal of investigation concerning the prospective informant's personal history, his position in the community, and whether or not he will be in a position to furnish information of value.

The line of demarcation between a National Defense Informant and a National Defense Source of Information is narrow, and these people should be carried as sources of information and not as informants until they have demonstrated their ability to produce information of value and are willing to continue to work and produce this information. It ofttimes requires months of contacting and developing a friendship to produce an informant of value, and after he has become an informant for the office, many times it is impossible for any one to contact this man except the agent who has developed the informant.

Respectfully submitted,

G. H. ERWIN
Special Agent

DEC 22 1941

66-2542-3-54

CHANGED TO

100-38083

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842pm/Imc/JC

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Post Office Box 1850
Atlanta, Georgia
July 18, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
FILES

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

7-246

Dear Sir: RE: NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS [redacted]

Please be advised that [redacted] born November 29, 1910 at Washington, Georgia, who is now a Hotel Clerk in the Georgian Hotel at Athens, Georgia, will be glad to furnish any information concerning National Defense Matters to the Bureau.

[redacted] has been employed as [redacted] for the last seven years in the Georgian Hotel at Athens, Georgia, and he has lived in Clarke County, Georgia, for the last 18 years. Prior to his being employed as a hotel clerk he attended the University of Georgia at Athens, Georgia. He has spent one year in the Army as a Second Lieutenant in charge of a CCC Camp and has no criminal record in Clarke County, Georgia.

b7D

[redacted] has a good reputation in the community, is single and lives at the Georgian Hotel. He is an ardent supporter of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and it is believed that his information will be reliable and it is further believed that MR. [redacted] is a man of integrity, since investigation at the Police Department has revealed this to be true.

It is requested that the Bureau check its files to determine whether or not he has a criminal record elsewhere.

[redacted] will be known in the Atlanta files as Confidential Informant [redacted]

Very truly yours,

F. R. Hammack

F. R. HAMMACK
Special Agent in Charge

LDC:CN

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EX - 5

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 JUL 22 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-14-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

CONF. INFT. Gen Intel Work
CONF. INFT.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Detroit, Michigan
July 21, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

2m

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS in General Intelligence Work

Dear Sir:

see Sec 45X

With reference to your letter of June 11, 1941, there is set out herein a summary of experiences, observations, and suggestions submitted to me by all the Special Agents of this office, in connection with the above captioned matter. Some of these suggestions apply particularly to the development of National Defense Informants, and are set out at the end of this letter.

Establish the fact that the Informant is in a position to obtain the information desired by the Bureau, and such will not be merely guesswork on his part.

Determine to your own satisfaction that he is willing to assist the Bureau and to cooperate by giving such information as comes to his attention.

Thoroughly acquaint him with the information desired by the Bureau, and have no doubt in your mind that he understands what information is desired.

Arrange for a ready and simple transmission of the information to the Bureau. Do not set up a complicated system, but some manner which would be agreeable to both the Agent and the Informant.

Have some knowledge of the background of the Informant. Get as much information as possible from the person who originally recommends that he be contacted, so that an intelligent interview can be conducted.

Determine his loyalty to the country, if possible; and if his motive for giving information is other than a patriotic one, attempt to ascertain just what the motive is.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 JUL 23
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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EX-14

Establish cordial relations with the informant. Be friendly and courteous toward him. Talk about subjects of mutual interest, and take a personal interest in him.

Continue to maintain frequent, regular contact with the informant; don't contact him just once and forget about him.

When it is believed a particular contact is of no value, eliminate his name from the lists of those to be contacted. No time should be wasted on those who cannot furnish information of value to the Bureau.

Don't accept as a fact every bit of information given to the Bureau by an Informant without making an effort to ascertain its true value.

Always contact the informant when he is alone, if at all possible; contacting in the presence of others tends to have him withhold some of the information. Consider the advisability of contacting him in the Bureau Field Office. This usually has a psychological effect on him, and will probably tend to cause him to furnish more complete and accurate information.

If a telephone contact is made, such as an appointment, before a personal contact, be sure the informant is not frightened by the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation wants to talk to him.

Advise the Informant that it is not necessary for him to make a trained investigator's report, but that you merely want a story of the happenings with which he is familiar. In this connection, he should be advised also that you, of course, want as many basic facts as possible.

When a potential Informant is interviewed, the interviewing Agent should submit a recommendation

as to his value, as he is in a better position to know his prospective value than anyone else.

Don't fail to make a record of the Informant in the office.

Don't fail to express appreciation, in some manner, for his assistance.

The following suggestions apply particularly to Plant and general National Defense Informants:

Always remember this type of Informant is usually a good citizen. Impress upon him the good he can do the country by furnishing such information to the Bureau. It is believed a better relationship can be developed by referring to them in their presence as "Contacts" instead of "Informants."

Impress them with the importance and the magnitude of the task, the responsibility that is upon them, and the value they can be to the Bureau in this work.

Impress upon them the peculiar knowledge they have of the plants, places of employment of other sources of information, which knowledge is not possessed by the agent.

Be sure they are familiar with the policy of the Bureau with reference to the labor situation, and employer-employee relations.

Inform them of the confidential nature of the program, and how they should keep it such; also, that any information furnished to this office will be kept in a confidential manner.

Tell them they should always protect themselves in the plant, so as not to put the plant or themselves in an embarrassing position.

They should fully understand they are not Agents of the Bureau, and they will not receive badges, credentials, etc., nor can the Bureau assist them in obtaining special privileges within the plant.

Contact Informants previously interviewed for possible recommendations of other Informants in the plant. When this is done, don't rush the person recommending, but give him time to think over possible Informants, before submitting names to the Bureau.

To obtain names of possible Informants in a plant where there are no Informants listed, it is suggested that the police officer on the beat, the pastor of the community church, the proprietor of a nearby eating place, if he is known, those persons employed in the plant who have made complaints to the office and are listed in the indices of the office, be contacted.

An employee in a lesser capacity in the Personnel Department of the plant should be considered for a source of information.

Be sure the Informant understands that the Bureau desires to have all information, even those matters which to him appear to be most trivial. Request that he furnish the office with all such information, and let the office evaluate it; because although to him it might seem slight, and unimportant, to the office it might be some important connecting link in an extensive investigation.

Very truly yours,

John S. Bugas

John S. Bugas
Special Agent in Charge

JAC:BMB

T-11

mf

July 25, 1941

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED 66-2542-3-55

Mr. F. R. Hammack
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
501 Healey Building
Atlanta, Georgia

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 PMW/mcbc
ON 7-13-81

RE: NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

Receipt is acknowledged of your communication dated July 18, 1941, regarding the following:

[redacted] b7D

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OR
DATE 10/6/81

In reply thereto, please be advised that from the information furnished it has not been possible to locate any record in the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

CI-152

DEC 22 1941

66-2542-3-51

CHANGED TO

100-38083

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 [illegible]
mc/SC

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investig

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

FCH:RMB

June 24, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Mendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Marbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

The Bureau policy at the present time in connection with development of Confidential National Defense Informants is that no individual who has been convicted of a felony can be considered as an informant in National Defense matters. The writer wishes to respectfully present his views in connection with this policy for the purpose of consideration being given to the relaxation of this policy insofar as Confidential National Defense Informants are concerned because it is felt that the Bureau is working under a tremendous handicap and is unable to develop an adequate number of truly productive informants under the existing policy.

The present policy was formulated in view of the peculiar nature of National Defense matters and because of the fact the Bureau did not wish to be placed in a position of being unjustly criticized by Government officials when information furnished the Bureau by individuals with criminal records is forwarded to other Government agencies. This policy, of course, was formulated in order that no embarrassment would be caused to the Bureau when information was forwarded to Government agencies or officials and such officials inquired as to the background of the source of the probably very serious accusations made against persons or organizations in the data submitted by the informant.

In all types of activities without exception, in law enforcement, it is an accepted fact that informants contribute tremendously to the success of the law enforcement activities, and it has been proven that individuals with a somewhat shady background, reputation and character are more productive and more valuable in the investigation of crimes than individuals who enjoy an enviable standing and reputation in the community. This is attributable in part to the fact that such individuals have more of an incentive to furnish information, which they alone are in a position to secure, because of fear of the law. In other words, it is hard to imagine, except in possibly some very remote exceptional cases, where ministers, church deacons, bank presidents,

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 JUL 17 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmu/mc/5C

CH-20

school professors and the like could possibly be in a position to ever have brought to their attention any information regarding criminal matters which they could impart to law enforcement officials. On the other hand, individuals with a criminal record or who are engaged in unlawful activities have been found to be willing to serve as informants, informers, or by any other appellation in the furnishing of information to law enforcement officials. This is undoubtedly possible because of the fact that such individuals in their unlawful activities come in contact with other individuals engaged in unlawful activities which unlawful activities in National Defense matters would include espionage, sabotage and subversive activities. For instance, it is believed that the National Maritime Union and several other labor unions, have been infiltrated by Communists and un-American individuals and it is also believed that they have in their employ numerous individuals with prior police records. Confidential National Defense Informants of the Bureau who enjoy an enviable reputation in the community and honesty and high standard of living would never possibly be in a position to gather information concerning such individuals in the National Maritime Union or other such organizations regarding Communist influences. It would only be possible for the Bureau to learn of such Communistic activities by securing informants within the National Maritime Union or other such organizations with such informants being among those who have past criminal records, because such disreputable persons will be confided in and will be approached more readily by Communists and foreign agents than would bank executives, ministers or even stevedores who have the reputation of being lawabiding and patriotic. One of the most serious problems facing us today is the infiltration of Communists and criminals into the labor groups. Strikes and slowdowns have occurred because of this. We have evidence that Communists use as their tools in subversion the substratum of society. Criminals know what other criminals are doing. Therefore, it must be assumed the criminals are better able to get information concerning such subversion and sabotage.

The objection that information, furnished by individuals with prior felony convictions, would be furnished to other Government agencies and that the Bureau would be embarrassed when it divulged the fact that such information was obtained from a felon could well be overcome by referring the information to the other Government agencies or Government officials with the statement that this information has been obtained from a confidential source of the Bureau who has previously been convicted of

a felony and with the warning that the information should be considered in the light of the individual's prior criminal activities.

The Bureau is charged with the responsibility and duty of investigating violations of the Espionage and Sabotage Statutes and also subversive activities, and during the present full emergency it is felt that the Bureau must take the necessary steps in order to cope with this responsibility and duty. It is believed that by the development and possible necessary payment of remuneration to individuals who belong to organizations, unions, etc. who have previously been convicted of felonies or who are now engaged in criminal activities, would be of tremendous material assistance to the Bureau in fulfilling its responsibilities in the National Defense program. Of course, the Bureau would not accept the information furnished by individuals on their face value as being accurate, but such information furnished by them would be weighed and considered in the light of the previous reputation and record of the individual. This could easily be accomplished by a notation on the 3x5 card maintained in the Chief Clerk's office on Confidential National Defense Informants reflecting that the informant has a prior felony conviction. It is the writer's opinion that if such individuals with prior records could be developed as informants, that it would cause a decided increase in the influx of important information into the Bureau regarding National Defense investigations.

As evidenced by the expression of Special Agents Inservice classes recently, the Field is somewhat upset and in a quandary in regard to the development of informants because of this Bureau policy, and, as evidenced by general remarks, it is felt that the Field upon learning that an individual has previously been convicted of a felony, immediately discontinues efforts to develop him as an informant of the Bureau because of this ruling.

In view of the writer's firmness in the opinion that the Bureau would not be embarrassed by the proper handling of Confidential National Defense Informants by the Field as well as the seat of Government and that no embarrassment will be experienced by the Bureau, and further in view of the fact that under the existing policy we have not established a proper coverage of productive informants, it is respectfully

requested that consideration be given to the granting of authority for the Field to develop individuals, regardless of the fact whether they have prior felony convictions or not, as Confidential National Defense Informants.

If this recommendation is approved by you, a letter to all Special Agents in Charge will be prepared instructing that in all cases where the name of an individual is submitted as an informant who has a criminal record, the symbol "CR" must precede his symbol number designated for him in order that at all times it will be known that such informant does possess a criminal record. It is believed that this action should be taken in order to insure that there will be no confusion and to insure that at all times all Special Agents and officials of the Bureau will be cognizant of the fact that any information submitted, is submitted by an individual who possesses a criminal record.

Respectfully,

F. C. Holloman

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
July 8, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Kendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

PEF:ML

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The National Defense Conference, at which were present Messrs. Tolson, E. A. Tamm, Drayton, Rosen, Clegg, Gurnea and Foxworth, considered the attached suggestion of Mr. Holloman to the effect that the Bureau change its policy with respect to the development of confidential national defense informants so as to utilize those informants of value who have criminal records.

Realizing the possible embarrassment to the Bureau resulting from the use of confidential informants with criminal records without indicating to the persons receiving the information the fact that the informant did have a criminal record, it is recommended that in all cases where the name of an individual is submitted as an informant who has a criminal record, the symbol "CR" precede the symbol number designated for him, in order that it will be immediately apparent that the informant possesses a criminal record. On all information developed from such confidential informants which is referred to other Government agencies, the letter of referral would state that the information came from a confidential informant who had a prior criminal record.

There is attached hereto for your approval a letter to all SAC's outlining the Bureau's policy in this respect.

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

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7/19/90 SP5CI/DMS 323/013

RECORDED 66-2542-3-59
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 JUL 17 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON TAMM

700 Tower Building
Jackson, Mississippi
July 23, 1941

74398

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the Bureau's communication addressed to all field offices, requesting that it be brought to the attention of all the special agents in the several field offices that the Bureau desires to be informed of any particular method or procedure used which would be unique in the making of confidential informants.

The Bureau's request has been brought to the attention of the special agents in this office. Special Agent John D. Sullivan has informed me by memorandum that he has never entered into any particular procedure in the developing of confidential informants, believing this to be of such a unique nature that a different approach is needed in almost every case. He has pointed out that there are a few things that are of a general nature that one usually does in each case in the development of confidential informants; namely, before developing any informant, the necessity for an informant must be shown; look for a man who will fit into that particular place from which information is desired; upon finding the man, obtain as much background information on him as possible, so that upon contacting him the coversation will be based on a common interest with him; and, after meeting a prospective informant on a common footing and securing his confidence, approach him on serving in the capacity of a confidential informant.

I believe that Special Agent Sullivan's remarks are especially well taken, and I am, therefore, submitting them to the Bureau for information purposes.

Very truly yours,

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PERCY WYLY, II
Special Agent in Charge

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July 15, 1941

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
CARSON
COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
MURPHY
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

In view of the extreme emergency and the definite responsibility of the Bureau in the investigation of espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and other national defense matters, the matter of the development of productive informants, so located in organizations, etc., that they are in a position to furnish information to the Bureau regarding matters over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction, is deemed of the utmost urgency. In view of the responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to be fully apprised at all times of any matters in his field office district, every reasonable step should be taken in order that real informants might be established.

In the past the Bureau's policy has been that no individual who has been convicted of a felony might be considered as a confidential informant in regard to national defense matters. In the interest of furthering the efficiency of the Bureau, this restriction is being removed. However, in each instance it shall be imperative that background information be secured regarding each confidential national defense informant, and particularly that the fact that such informant has a criminal record be definitely established. The Bureau should be appropriately advised of the criminal record of any individual whom a Field Office proposes to utilize, and, in designating the symbol number of such informant having a criminal record, it will be necessary that the letters "CR" immediately precede the usual symbol number which would ordinarily be given to a confidential national defense informant. In this manner, the Bureau, upon the receipt of any information from a Field Office which was furnished by an informant who possesses a criminal record, would be put on notice that

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 17 1941
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such individual has a criminal record and the reliability of the information might be considered accordingly. In the event that it is deemed advisable at any time to transmit to any other government agency information furnished by an informant who has a criminal record, it will be necessary that the government agency be advised that the information was obtained from a confidential informant who possesses a police record and that such information should be considered by the agency in the light of that fact.

With the exception of the restriction that no individual who has been convicted of a felony might be considered as a confidential national defense informant, the instructions contained in Bureau Bulletin No. 17, First Series 1941, dated May 15, 1941, are to be strictly adhered to.

Very truly yours,

J. Ed. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/ mc/JC

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July 15, 1941

SAC	ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
	BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
	BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BOSTON	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BUTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	CHARLOTTE	JACKSON	NEW YORK (E.J. Connelley)	SAN JUAN
	CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SIOUX FALLS
	DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

In view of the extreme emergency and the definite responsibility of the Bureau in the investigation of espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and other national defense matters, the matter of the development of productive informants, so located in organizations, etc., that they are in a position to furnish information to the Bureau regarding matters over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction, is deemed of the utmost urgency. In view of the responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to be fully apprised at all times of any matters in his field office district, every reasonable step should be taken in order that real informants might be established.

In the past the Bureau's policy has been that no individual who has been convicted of a felony might be considered as a confidential informant in regard to national defense matters. In the interest of furthering the efficiency of the Bureau, this restriction is being removed. However, in each instance it shall be imperative that background information be secured regarding each confidential national defense informant, and particularly that the fact that such informant has a criminal record be definitely established. The Bureau should be appropriately advised of the criminal record of any individual whom a Field Office proposes to utilize, and, in designating the symbol number of such informant having a criminal record, it will be necessary that the letters "CR" immediately precede the usual symbol number which would ordinarily be given to a confidential national defense informant. In this manner, the Bureau, upon the receipt of any information from a Field Office which was furnished by an informant who possesses a criminal record, would be put on notice that

such individual has a criminal record and the reliability of the information might be considered accordingly. In the event that it is deemed advisable at any time to transmit to any other government agency information furnished by an informant who has a criminal record, it will be necessary that the government agency be advised that the information was obtained from a confidential informant who possesses a police record and that such information should be considered by the agency in the light of that fact.

With the exception of the restriction that no individual who has been convicted of a felony might be considered as a confidential national defense informant, the instructions contained in Bureau Bulletin No. 17, First Series 1941, dated May 15, 1941, are to be strictly adhered to.

Very truly yours,

J. Ed. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nandan
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 3, 1941

RHC:ALM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmd
mc/JC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P.E. FOXWORTH

On July 1, 1941, Mr. Charles F. Deck, 936 West Beverly Street, Staunton, Virginia, was referred to the Plant Survey Section by the Director's office. It appears that Mr. Deck had just completed a tour of the Bureau and had expressed a desire to become a confidential informant in national defense matters.

Mr. Deck was interviewed by the writer and stated that he has for some time worked in connection with shipbuilding and that he recently applied for a position at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia. In connection with his application for employment, he was afforded a physical examination by a Dr. Longacre who was employed by the Dry Dock Company. Mr. Deck advised further that his application was turned down because the physical examination revealed that he had a slight hernia. He protested against this finding and inferred that in his opinion he was not employed because of "politics" within the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. He stated that he felt that he would make a valuable confidential informant for this Bureau with regard to any matters transpiring at the shipyard. However, in order for him to get employment so that he could be of service to this Bureau, it would be necessary that the Bureau use its influence to have the company or Dr. Longacre rescind the original findings. He requested that the Bureau write a letter to the company so that he might secure the job.

INDEXED
RECORDED

66-2542-3-61

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 JUL 9 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The writer advised Mr. Deck that this would be impossible and pointed out to him further that even if it were possible his value as an informant would be nullified were this Bureau to take an active interest in securing his employment, since this fact would become known throughout the shipyard. Mr. Deck apparently had not thought of this and agreed that that would more or less obviate the possibility of this Bureau's acting on his behalf. Mr. Deck was requested to communicate with the Richmond Office in the event that he receives employment at the Newport News Shipyard or any other shipyard. This he promised to do.

Respectfully,

R. H. Cunningham

R. H. Cunningham

CH-26
132

JTM:hmg

66-2542-3

July 11, 1941

Special Agent in Charge
Newark, New Jersey

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/
mc/JC

Dear Sir:

It has been called to my attention through Special Agent John T. Murphy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C., that his cousin, Miss Beatrice LeCraft, 28 Duncan Avenue, Jersey City, New Jersey, has information concerning the possible development of confidential informants among the deaf and dumb people.

It is desired that an Agent interview Miss LeCraft in order to obtain from her any information she might have concerning the names and locations of various clubs organized and maintained by these deaf and dumb people. The purpose of obtaining this information is to determine the possibility of developing confidential informants among the deaf and dumb people in their various activities.

The Bureau wishes to be advised of the results of your interview with Miss LeCraft.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
JUL 11 1941
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CH-11

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66-2542-3-62
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUL 16 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

July 18, 1941 74392

CONFIDENTIAL

JTM:hmg

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp. 6 bjw/bjs
ON 6-6-94

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THE DIRECTOR

There is herein set forth a list of confidential national defense informants who can be considered as key informants in the particular Field Divisions wherein they are situated.

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EXTENDED BY
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2/3
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 FCR 1/91

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CONF. INT.

[redacted]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tam
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
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EAT:LH

July 20, 1941

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REASON FOR EXTENSION
FORM 0, 1-2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-14-91
7-14-81

THE DIRECTOR

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp6 Kja/ejs
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

In connection with the attached memorandum summarizing the informant coverage of the various field offices, I desire to point out that although the Chicago Division is indicated as not having a Japanese informant, it was, in fact, the Chicago Office which developed Fay Watanave, who is credited as an informant of the New York Office. You will recall that this is the Japanese girl who formerly worked for us in the Chicago district but for whom appropriate arrangements have been made to work in the New York district because of the probabilities of her being able to produce better information there.

The Washington Field Office is credited with having as an informant on German activities [redacted] As a matter of fact, he literally fell into our laps and it is no credit to the Washington Field Office that he has proved to be a valuable informant.

b6
b7C
b7D

Respectfully,

E. A. Tamm

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7-13-81 2842 PMD mc JC

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RECORDED 66-2542-3-
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 JUL 31 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Original cannot be located and is not on record. When original is received in Files Division it will be filed either with this copy or may be given a new serial.
7/28/41

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Foxworth
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Tamm

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RPC:WGR July 19, 1941

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 Lija/Lijo ON 4-22-94 83-1343

THE DIRECTOR

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Attached hereto is a memorandum containing a Bureau analysis of the really productive, worthwhile confidential national defense informants throughout the Field. It will be noted that there are a total of 53 informants falling within this category. By way of recapitulation there is set out for your convenience and information hereinafter, a tabulation of these informants, together with their names by Field Office, listed as to the type of information being furnished by them. Additional background and personal information concerning each informant mentioned is set forth in the attached memorandum.

ALBANY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Wylie B. Goodrich
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

BALTIMORE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

BIRMINGHAM FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Charles B. Powell
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

BOSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	1	Mrs. Muriel Dexter
Japanese activities:	0	

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY SP7MAC/JC REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2-2 DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91 9-15-81

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66-2542-3-64

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 JUL 31 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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Mr. Glavin
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Mr. Drayton
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Mr. Hendon
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BUFFALO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

BUTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Roger Murray
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CHARLOTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

CHICAGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Leon Lazar
German activities:	1	Leonora Shiller
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CINCINNATI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	John J. Edmington
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CLEVELAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Edward J. Bedenko
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

DALLAS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Ernest Hamilton
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

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DENVER FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

DES MOINES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

DETROIT FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	2	Zygmund Dobrzynski William Gorneay
German activities:	1	Henry W. Hagemaster
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

EL PASO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

GRAND RAPIDS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	1	Etel Fritz Arronge
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	1	Dr. Shunso Sakamaki

HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	William McCuistion
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

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MUNTINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

INDIANAPOLIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Anthony P. Keilman
German activities:	1	Alice Bobbitt
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

JACKSON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

JUNEAU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

KANSAS CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Louis Hernandez
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

KNOXVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

LITTLE ROCK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

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LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Harold B. Moffitt
German activities:	1	William A. Doehamer
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	1	Kayoichi Doi

LOUISVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Leonard Humphreys
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

MEMPHIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

MIAMI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

MILWAUKEE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

NEWARK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

NEW HAVEN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

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NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	Frank Alonzo Carlton

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NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on German activities:	1	Albert Schweikle (This individual also furnishes information on Italian activities)
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

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NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	3	Adriane Duffy Abraham Haidtish Jack Wren
German activities:	4	Elsa Hagen Lawrence Fred E. Lawrence Henry P. Nelson, Jr. Guenther Reinhardt
Italian activities:	1	Dr. Renato Senise
Japanese activities:	1	Fay Matanave (Watanabe)

OKLAHOMA CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

OMAHA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	1	Pasquale Ragliano
Japanese activities:	0	

PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

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(W)

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Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

PITTSBURGH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2 Charles S. Close
James Joseph Mannion
German activities: 2 Barney H. Doran
George H. Kimmich
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

PORTLAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1 Robert Hood
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

RICHMOND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAINT LOUIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAINT PAUL FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SALT LAKE CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAN ANTONIO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1 Harry Ballard
German activities: 2 Bert De Baun
Frederick G. Neuhauser
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

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(U)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
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SAN DIEGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 4 Kenneth R. Bartlett
Charles Estell Evans
Kenneth Otis
John Peter Rasmussen
(This individual also furnishes information on German activities)

German activities: 2 Hans Bernhard
Constance R. Dean
(This individual also furnishes information on Italian and Communist activities)

Italian activities: 1 Faustino Buttici

Japanese activities: 2 Joe Morisue
Frank P. Tebbetts

SAN JUAN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAVANNAH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 1 Clarence T. Arai

CONFIDENTIAL

SIOUX FALLS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
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SPRINGFIELD FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	1	Aleksy Polyponko
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
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CC-158

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FJS:PF
66-2542-3

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. JULY 22, 1941 32128

Transmit the following message to: ALBANY, ATLANTA, BALTIMORE, BIRMINGHAM, BOSTON, BUFFALO, BUTTE, CHARLOTTE, CHICAGO, DENVER, DES MOINES, DETROIT, GRAND RAPIDS, HONOLULU, HOUSTON, HUNTINGTON, INDIANAPOLIS, JACKSON, JUNEAU, KANSAS CITY, LITTLE ROCK, LOS ANGELES, MEMPHIS, MIAMI, NEWARK, NEW ORLEANS, NEW YORK, PHILADELPHIA, PHOENIX, PITTSBURGH, PORTLAND, RICHMOND, ST. PAUL, SALT LAKE CITY, SAN ANTONIO, SAN FRANCISCO, SIOUX FALLS, SPRINGFIELD

RELET DATED JUNE ELEVEN, FORTYONE, CONCERNING EXPERIENCES OF AGENTS IN DEVELOPING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. IMPERATIVE THIS INFORMATION BE SUBMITTED BY AUGUST TWENTYEIGHT.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-13-81 BY 2542 DMC MC/JC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 22 1941
NAVAL RADIO

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Mason
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 22 1941

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U.S. DEPARTMENT

SENT VIA _____ M Per _____

S:PF

L BUREAU OF INVESTIG
TATES DEPARTMENT OF

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

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JULY 21, 1941

BALTIMORE, CLEVELAND, DENVER, HONOLULU, HOUSTON, JACKSON, JUNEAU, KNOXVILLE, LOUISVILLE, MILWAUKEE, NEWARK, NEW HAVEN, OKLAHOMA CITY, OMAHA, SAN DIEGO, SAN FRANCISC SPRINGFIELD, ~~WASHINGTON (BY MAIL)~~

RELET DATED JULY TWO, FORTYONE, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS.

IMPERATIVE SUBMIT DATA AMSD TOMORROW.

HOOVER

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION JUL 21 1941 NAVAL RADIO

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66-2542-3-66

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 7 JUL 24 1941 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
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Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
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JUL 21 1941

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66-2542-9-67

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100-38083

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

EAT:LH

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 20, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
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Mr. Quinn Tamm
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Miss Gandy

Ex B
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

In connection with the attached memorandum summarizing the informant coverage of the various field offices, I desire to point out that although the Chicago Division is indicated as not having a Japanese informant, it was, in fact, the Chicago Office which developed Fay Watanave, who is credited as an informant of the New York Office. You will recall that this is the Japanese girl who formerly worked for us in the Chicago district but for whom appropriate arrangements have been made to work in the New York district because of the probabilities of her being able to produce better information there. (U)

The Washington Field Office is credited with having as an informant on German activities [redacted] As a matter of fact, he literally fell into our laps and it is no credit to the Washington Field Office that he has proved to be a valuable informant.

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Respectfully,

E. A. Tamm

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FOR
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7-13-81

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ON 4-22-94
83-1343

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
July 18, 1941

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DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-14-91

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR 7-14-81

There is herein set forth a list of confidential national defense informants who can be considered as key informants in the particular Field Divisions wherein they are situated.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-6 bia/ldjs
ON 6-6-94

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[redacted]

66-254 3.15

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Post Office Box 812
Chicago, Illinois

August 2, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 PMD mc/JC

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the Bureau letter dated July 19, 1941 advising that MR. JOHN MANNING, a former Special Agent now employed by Socony-Vacuum Oil Company at New York, stated that the Bureau apparently has a confidential informant in the Calumet and Hammond, Illinois region named COLONEL RILEY, inasmuch as this person had come to the Standard Oil Company refinery at Chicago in August, 1940, to request information concerning persons named LANG and GEBHARDT. It is further mentioned in reference letter that MR. MANNING stated that this COLONEL RILEY is very friendly with the owners of the United Boiler and Heating Foundry Company and further that COLONEL RILEY had requested the information for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The reference Bureau letter advises that the Bureau files failed to reveal information concerning COLONEL RILEY being a confidential informant of the Chicago office. The Bureau requested in its letter that the Chicago office conduct appropriate inquiries concerning COLONEL RILEY to determine the truth of these statements and to ascertain whether or not he is using the name of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to gain information for his own personal use, and that the Bureau be advised immediately as to the results of this investigation.

INDEXED
RECORDED 66-2542-3-90

A check of the indices of this office fails to reflect any information concerning COLONEL RILEY. However, attention is directed to the RUC report of Special Agent W. E. ASSMUS (A) dated at Chicago, Illinois, June 11, 1941 in the case entitled "WILLIE GEBHARD alias Bill Gebhardt; INTERNAL SECURITY -G" which contains information to the effect that the subject resides at Hammond, Indiana and is employed by the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company of East Chicago, Indiana. It is possible that the subject of the latter file may be the GEBHARDT referred to on the Bureau letter. It is noted that the Indianapolis office

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R 582 JUL 19 1961

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EX-4

was made office or origin in this case and that office may possibly possess further information at this time.

The check of the local telephone directory reflected that the United Boiler and Heating Company is located at 4909 Homan Avenue, in Hammond, Indiana. It is also noted from the telephone directory that the Sooony-Vacuum Oil Company maintains a plant and refinery at East Chicago, Indiana.

From the above it appears quite probable that COLONEL RILEY may possibly be an informant o f the Indianapolis Field Division and that office is requested to conduct the investigation requested by the Bureau in the reference letter.

Very truly yours,

W. S. DEVEREAUX
Special Agent in Charge

SED:RBH

cc - 2 Indianapolis

51765

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mcfc

OCT 31 194

66-2542-3-71

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-9-41

CH-18

181

Papers rec'd & changed
[illegible]

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

RPC:WGR

July 19, 1941

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY RPTMACSC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91
9-15-81

DECLASSIFIED ON 4-22-94 83-1343

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Attached hereto is a memorandum containing a Bureau analysis of the really productive, worthwhile confidential national defense informants throughout the Field. It will be noted that there are a total of 53 informants falling within this category. By way of recapitulation there is set out for your convenience and information hereinafter, a tabulation of these informants, together with their names by Field Office, listed as to the type of information being furnished by them. Additional background and personal information concerning each informant mentioned is set forth in the attached memorandum.

ALBANY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	X-2	[redacted]
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

BALTIMORE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

BIRMINGHAM FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

BOSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	[redacted]
Italian activities:	1	
Japanese activities:	0	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 PMU MC/JC

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RECORDED
66-2542-3-714

1 AUG 29 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
TAMM
FOXWORTH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONF. INFT. in Genl. Intel. Matters — genl.

CH-13

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CONFIDENTIAL

BUFFALO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

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BUTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CHARLOTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

CHICAGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	1	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CINCINNATI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	1	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

b6
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b7D

CLEVELAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	1	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

DALLAS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CONFIDENTIAL

DENVER FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

CONFIDENTIAL

DES MOINES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

DETROIT FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	2
	German activities:	1
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

b6
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EL PASO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

GRAND RAPIDS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	1
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	1

b6
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b7D

HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HUNTINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

INDIANAPOLIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1
German activities:	1
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

JACKSON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

JUNEAU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

KANSAS CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

KNOXVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

LITTLE ROCK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 1

b6
b7C
b7D

LOUISVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: ~~0~~ 1
Japanese activities: 0

MEMPHIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

MIAMI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: ~~0~~ 2
German activities: ~~0~~ 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

b6
b7C
b7D

MILWAUKEE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: ~~0~~ 1
German activities: ~~0~~ 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

NEWARK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

NEW HAVEN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1

b6
b7C
b7D

CONFIDENTIAL

PITTSBURGH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2
German activities: 2
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

PORTLAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

[redacted]

RICHMOND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAINT LOUIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

[redacted]

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b7D

SAINT PAUL FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SALT LAKE CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAN ANTONIO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 2
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

[redacted]

b6
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on German activities: 1 [redacted] (This individual also furnishes information on Italian activities)

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

b6
b7C
b7D

NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 3 [redacted]

German activities: 4

Italian activities: 1

Japanese activities: 1

OKLAHOMA CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

OMAHA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 1 [redacted]

Japanese activities: 0

b6
b7C
b7D

PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SAN DIEGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 4 [redacted]

(This individual also furnishes information on German activities)

German activities: 2 [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(This individual also furnishes information on Italian and Communist activities)

Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 2 [redacted]

SAN JUAN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAVANNAH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: ~~0~~ 2 [redacted]
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 1 [redacted]

b6
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b7D

SIOUX FALLS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CONFIDENTIAL

SPRINGFIELD FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 1 [redacted]
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

b6
b7C
b7D

CONFIDENTIAL

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

JTM:wmc

August 8, 1941

DECLASSIFIED BY Spl Ejs/Ejs
ON 4-22-91
83-1343

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

There is attached hereto a memorandum containing the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed in each Field Office, who are members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any of the other front organizations whose activities are known to be inimical to the welfare of the Government. Included in these numbers are many Informants who are considered key Informants of their respective offices.

It will be noted that the total number of all such Informants is 227.

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Attachment

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 PMO/MC/JC
IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXTENSION 2
FCIM, II, 1-
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-91
7-13-91

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-91 BY 2842 PMO/MC/JC

EX-9 RECORDED
INDEXED

66-2542-3-72
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 AUG 15 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TAMM
FOXWORTH

cc- Nichols in connection with Whitehead Book
BBA - Cam
12-29-55

ENCL: 0

CONF. INFT. in Genl. Intel. Matters - genl.

CH-18

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IR 582 JUL 19 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY ... ON ... 83-13431

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY ... REASON FOR EXTENSION ... FCIM, H, 1-... DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION ... 9-15-81

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 PMD mc/JC

MEMORANDUM

August 8, 1941

There is herein set forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed in each Field Office who are members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any of the other front organizations whose activities are known to be inimical to the welfare of the Government.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FIELD OFFICE	COMMUNIST PARTY	COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS	GERMAN	ITALIAN	JAPANESE	OTHER NATIONALISTIC ORGANIZATIONS
ALBANY	0	1	1	0	0	0
ATLANTA	1	1	0	0	0	0
BALTIMORE	1	0	1	0	0	0
BIRMINGHAM	0	0	0	1	0	0
BOSTON	1	7	2	1	0	1
BUFFALO	1	1	0	0	0	0
BUTTE	1	1	0	0	0	0
CHARLOTTE	1	0	0	0	0	0
CHICAGO	4	39	2	0	0	0
CINCINNATI	3	12	0	0	0	0
CLEVELAND	1	0	0	0	0	0
DALLAS	3	0	0	0	0	0
DENVER	1	0	0	0	0	0
DES MOINES	0	0	0	0	0	0
DETROIT	6	0	3	0	0	0
EL PASO	0	0	0	0	0	0

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R 582 JUL 25 1961

EX-9

CONFIDENTIAL

66-2542-3-72

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 AUG 15 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	COMMUNIST PARTY	COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS	GERMAN	ITALIAN	JAPANESE	OTHER NATIONALISTIC ORGANIZATIONS
GRAND RAPIDS	0	0	0	0	0	0
HONOLULU	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOUSTON	2	1	0	0	0	0
HUNTINGTON	0	5	0	2	0	0
INDIANAPOLIS	3	1	1	0	0	0
JACKSON	0	0	0	0	0	0
JUNEAU	0	0	0	0	0	0
KANSAS CITY	3	0	2	0	0	0
KNOXVILLE	0	0	0	0	0	0
LITTLE ROCK	0	0	0	0	0	0
LOS ANGELES	2	0	2	0	2	0
LOUISVILLE	2	0	0	0	0	0
MEMPHIS	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIAMI	3	1	3	0	0	0
MILWAUKEE	1	0	0	0	0	0
NEWARK	0	3	1	0	0	0
NEW HAVEN	3	0	2	1	0	0
NEW ORLEANS	2	0	0	0	0	0
NEW YORK	4	6	1	0	0	0
OKLAHOMA CITY	0	2	0	0	0	0
OMAHA	1	0	1	0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	COMMUNIST PARTY	COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS	GERMAN	ITALIAN	JAPANESE	OTHER NATIONALISTIC ORGANIZATIONS
PHILADELPHIA	3	0	1	1	0	0
PHOENIX	0	0	1	0	3	0
PITTSBURGH	1	1	2	0	0	0
PORTLAND	1	1	1	0	0	0
RICHMOND	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAINT LOUIS	4	0	0	0	0	0
SAINT PAUL	3	0	1	0	0	0
SALT LAKE CITY	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAN ANTONIO	2	0	0	0	0	0
SAN DIEGO	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAN FRANCISCO	2	0	1	3	0	0
SAN JUAN	0	0	0	0	0	2
SAVANNAH	8	0	8	9	0	0
SEATTLE	2	4	0	0	0	0
SIOUX FALLS	0	0	0	0	0	0
SPRINGFIELD	0	0	0	0	0	0
WASHINGTON, D. C.	0	1	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	76	88	37	18	5	3

GRAND TOTAL 227

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM DO-

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson	K ( )
Mr. E. A. Tamm	( )
Mr. Clegg	( )
Mr. Foxworth	( )
Mr. Glavin	( )
Mr. Ladd	( )
Mr. Nichols	( )
Mr. Rosen	( )
Mr. Carson	( )
Mr. Quinn Tamm	( )
Mr. Tracy	( )
Miss Gandy	( )
	( )

I would like to have this revised to date. Many Docs classified the attached was incorrect & some insisted they had had real informants for some time when this showed none.

See Me ( )
Note and Return ( )
Remarks:

H.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 PMJ/mc
JC

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

[redacted]

...ral Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

EAT:DS

August 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

I have made arrangements for the obtaining of Communistic and subversive information from several individuals. This information will come in a typewritten form with its source indicated by a numerical designation. It is not necessary to retype these memoranda or to destroy them as is done with some information from anonymous outside sources. The material can be filed in the Bureau files in the form in which it is received.

The informant designated as [redacted] is a member of the Communist Party in Detroit, Michigan. The informants designated as [redacted] are members of the Communist Party in Chicago, Illinois. Informant No. [redacted] is active in Italian Fascist activities in the Chicago area.

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-91
7-13-81

Very truly yours,

Edward A. Tamm

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY Sph/lja/lja
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

RECORDED & INDEXED

66-2542-3-73
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
8 AUG 23 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CH-17
123

8/15-91

EX-9

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CHC:CSH

August 27, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The Executives Conference, Messrs. E. A. Tamm, Nichols, Ladd, Tracy, Hince, Rosen, R. H. Laughlin, Holloman and Carson being present, considered and unanimously approved for transmission to the field the attached bulletin with regard to confidential informants and the manner in which they are to be reported to the Bureau.

Respectfully,
For the Conference,

Clyde Tolson, Chairman

W. R. Glavin, Secretary

Approved for the Director
EW 8/27/41

1 ENCL.

66-2542-3-74
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 SEP 17 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
TAMM
TREE

66-2542-7551

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

RHC:MK

August 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

detached & forded with exec conf memo of 8/29/41 CHC

There is transmitted herewith a proposed bulletin for the field.

Confusion exists at the present time with regard to the method and procedure of reporting the identity of Confidential General Investigative Informants, Confidential National Defense Informants, Confidential Plant Informants, and sources of information. The accompanying bulletin establishes a uniform procedure in this regard.

While it is realized that this bulletin will have little application to Confidential General Investigative Informants, nevertheless it is felt that uniformity will simplify the matter for the field and remove any question that may exist in this regard.

Respectfully,

R. H. Cunningham

R. H. Cunningham

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 SEP 17 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1 ENCL. C

FOXWORTH

66-2542-3-74

66-2542

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

CC-160

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Fenwerth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 31, 1941

SJT:MLG

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: Reporting Confidential Informants.

Bureau bulletin #17, First Series 1941, dated May 15, 1941, on page 23 sets forth:

"In the case of information furnished the field office by an individual who is not carried as a regular CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANT, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT, and whose identity should not be made known to persons outside the Bureau, the identity of such individual should not be disclosed in reports which will be transmitted to agencies outside the Bureau. In such cases, it will be necessary for the individual to be given a temporary symbol, and the first letter of this symbol should be the letter "T". The Bureau of course in these cases must be advised by a separate communication marked "Confidential," reflecting the identity of such individuals referred to in reports".

Bureau bulletin #8, First Series 1941, dated February 18, 1941, sets forth on page 2 the following instructions to the field to discontinue the practice of including undeveloped leads in an investigative report proper, as follows:

"In order that the Bureau and division offices receiving copies of reports and letters may be advised as to the identity of persons from whom information is obtained, a separate sheet should be affixed to investigative reports and letters, setting forth appropriate identifying data concerning the various sources of information, contacts and informants who are referred to in each report or letter."

It appears, therefore, that the instructions in Bulletin #17 counteract or void in part the instructions contained in Bulletin #8. The result is confusion in the field and this confusion in the field results in confusion in the Bureau's Administrative Section.

We are in receipt of two letters from SAC Shivers of Honolulu re Dr. Isaac Aisaku Kawasaki, Information Concerning, and

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

66-2542-3-74

Bureau Bulletin 8-22-41 RHC

Adolph Biederman, Jr., with aliases, Internal Security (G), wherein the confidential informants mentioned in reports of two Special Agents are set out in letter form and not as an extra page on the back of the investigative report.

This situation is most undesirable and should be clarified immediately by the National Defense Division. The field should be informed exactly what practice is desired and further reference should be made to the two bulletins above referred to in order that the situation may be clarified.

Respectfully,

S. J. Tracy

Ex Conference
Tolson
Fornwalt
Ladd
Clegg
Carson
Rosen
Ea Tamm
Nichols
2 Tamm
Tracy

On Aug 8 noted to send out Bulletin to clarify the apparent confusion.
SJ
8/2/41.

Bulletin to all SACs

c
o
p
y gmh
JTM:RMW

L BUREAU OF INVESTIG
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

August 25, 1941

Transmit the following message to:

ALBANY	MIAMI
BIRMINGHAM	MILWAUKEE
BOSTON	NEWARK
BUTTE	NEW HAVEN
CHARLOTTE	NEW ORLEANS
CHICAGO	NEW YORK
CINCINNATI	OMAHA
CLEVELAND	PHILADELPHIA
DALLAS	PHOENIX
DENVER	PITTSBURGH
DES MOINES	PORTLAND
DETROIT	SAINT LOUIS
GRAND RAPIDS	SAINT PAUL
HONOLULU	SAN ANTONIO
HOUSTON	SAN DIEGO
INDIANAPOLIS	SAN FRANCISCO
JUNEAU	SAN JUAN
KANSAS CITY	SAVANNAH
KNOXVILLE	SEATTLE
LOS ANGELES	SPRINGFIELD
LOUISVILLE	WASHINGTON

SUBMIT IMMEDIATELY SEPARATE LETTER RE EACH REGULARLY PAID CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PLANT INFORMANT RECEIVING IN EXCESS OF TEN DOLLARS PER MONTH. STATE MAOUNT PAID, WHEN SERVICES COMMENCED, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF STATEMENT AS TO THE NATURE OF INFORMATION ACTUALLY FURNISHED TO DATE, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS IN THIS REGARD.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

(TELETYPE)

RECORDED

66-2542-3-74X

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 26 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542

69

CONFIDENTIAL

LAH:MET

September 17, 1941

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-81
7-13-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

THE DIRECTOR

There is set out below the total number of names in the Sources of Information File, Contact File, and Confidential Informant File in each of the Bureau's field offices. This information was requested in Bureau Bulletin #29, dated August 1, 1941. These figures are exclusive of the American Legion. (u)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 PMD/mc/JC

Office	Sources of information	Contacts	Confidential informants
Albany, New York			
Atlanta, Georgia			
Baltimore, Maryland			
Birmingham, Alabama			
Boston, Massachusetts			
Buffalo, New York			
Butte, Montana			
Charlotte, N. C.			
Chicago, Illinois			
Cincinnati, Ohio			
Cleveland, Ohio			
Dallas, Texas			
Denver, Colorado			
Des Moines, Iowa			
Detroit, Michigan			
El Paso, Texas			
Grand Rapids, Michigan			
Honolulu, Hawaii			
Houston, Texas			
Huntington, West Virginia			
Indianapolis, Indiana			
Jackson, Mississippi			
Juneau, Alaska			
Kansas City, Missouri			
Knoxville, Tennessee			
Little Rock, Arkansas			
Los Angeles, California			

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Foxworth
Ladd
Levin
Nichols
Rosen
Carson
Drayton
Quinn Tamm
Henifon
Tracy
Gandy

b7D

DECLASSIFIED BY 846 ON 4-22-94 89-1343

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-75660 X

RECORDED 26 25 12-3-75 X

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 22 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Office	Sources of Information	Contacts	Confidential Informants
Louisville, Kentucky			
Memphis, Tennessee			
Miami, Florida			
Milwaukee, Wisconsin			
Newark, New Jersey			
New Haven, Connecticut			
New Orleans, Louisiana			
New York, New York			
New York, New York (Natl. Def. Div.)			
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma			
Omaha, Nebraska			
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania			
Phoenix, Arizona			
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania			
Portland, Oregon			
Providence, Rhode Island			
Richmond, Virginia			
Saint Louis, Missouri			
Saint Paul, Minnesota			
Salt Lake City, Utah			
San Antonio, Texas			
San Diego, California			
San Francisco, California			
San Juan, Puerto Rico			
Savannah, Georgia			
Seattle, Washington			
Sioux Falls, South Dakota			
Springfield, Illinois			
Washington, D. C.			

b7D

Bureau Bulletin #29 requests that a comparative report be submitted by November 10, 1941, at which time another tabulation will be prepared.

Respectfully,

H. H. Clegg

CONFIDENTIAL

October 8, 1941

JHW:MES
~~65-37361~~
66-2542 -3-75

RECORDED

Special Agent in Charge
Boston, Massachusetts

Re: RICHARD STECKER
ESPIONAGE - G.

Dear Sir:

I am transmitting herewith appropriate copies of a letter dated September 16, 1941 from Mr. Wesley M. Mewer to the Bureau concerning Richard Stecker, which is self-explanatory.

It is desired that Mr. Stanislaus Zbyszko, Old Orchard Beach, Maine, be interviewed for any further information that he may have concerning Stecker. At that time consideration should be given to conducting an investigation of Stecker to determine whether he is engaged in activities inimical to the best interests of this Government.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 DMD
MC/JC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

Enclosure

CH-22 169 180

65-37361-1

~~65-27961-1~~
66-2542-3-75
JHW:PES

October 8, 1941

Mr. Wesley M. Mower
Attorney at Law
Old Orchard Beach, Maine

Dear Mr. Mower:

This will acknowledge your letter dated September 16, 1941. I wish to express my appreciation to you for having made the information set out therein available to me. You may be assured that it has been carefully noted and will be made a part of the permanent records of this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 DMJ
mc/JC

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-27961-1

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Gravin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hoffman
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

CH-23

C. FAYETTE STAPLES POST
NO. 57

THE AMERICAN LEGION
OLD ORCHARD BEACH, MAINE

September 16, 1941.

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen,

Mr. Stanislaus Zbyszko, former heavyweight wrestling champion, who makes his home here has just returned from Detroit and is much concerned about the possible activities of a German by the name of Richard Stecker who was an active agent of Germany during the First World War, and an agent for the Schimmelpfennig, but under another name.

Mr. Zbyszko has had a great deal of experience in connection with such matters as he has travelled over the world and hears a great deal that the average person does not, as he speaks fluently in many languages, for which reason I felt that it should be passed along as coming from a reliable source. If he could be procured he would very valuable in certain sections, being familiar with all of the western continent, and in fact a large part of the world.

The man Stecker formerly stopped at the Gotham Hotel but has recently moved.

Yours very truly,

Wesley M. Merrill

66-2542-3
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 SEP 18 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FIVE

Indianapolis Ind
Sept. 19, 1941

Stephen Early
Secretary to the President
White House
Washington D. C.

Dear Sir

I am sending this letter to you hoping you will see fit to present it to Mr. Roosevelt.

(Pardon the pencil but I ran out of ink.)

Yours Truly
Arnold D. Ritchey
2744 Sugar Grove
Indianapolis Ind

ARNOLD D. Ritchey

Justice

Conf infts in Genl intell Genl

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2542 DMJ/MCLJC

RESPECTFULLY REFERRED
FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT
AND CONSIDERATION
M H McIntyre
Secretary to the President

FED. BU. OF INV.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SEP 23 1941 A.M.
DIVISION OF RECORDS
FED. BU. OF INV.

Letter to Mr Ritchey
cc Indianapolis
Wrote of union
PDB 10/1

RECORDED
INDEXED

66-2542-3-76
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
8 SEP 23 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FILE

Indianapolis Ind
Sept, 17, 1941

President Of United States:
White House
Washington D. C.

Dear Sir:

I hope you see this letter and see fit to act upon it.

I have ~~at~~ an idea for contacting one of the espionage groups of the Axis Powers in this country and gaining their confidence in such a manner that I will be able to give information of value to the law and break up or check their activities or at least attempt and would like to have official sanction of such an action. I want no pay from the Government and no publicity. I only hope that if my attempt is successful I might be able to get an appointment in one of the Federal law enforcement agencies.

I am a ~~natural~~ born citizen and will welcome any investigation you care to make of me or my character.

Yours Truly
Arnold D Ritchey
2144 Sugar Grove
Ind

66-2547-3-76

After.....days, return to

2144 Sugar Grove

INDIANAPOLIS, IND.

INDIANAPOLIS, IND. 2
SEP 17
3-PM
1941

BUY
DEFENSE
BONDS AND

UNITED STATES POSTAGE
INC
VP
3 CENTS 3

Personal

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 28425 mc JC

Mr Stephen Early
White House
Washington
D. C.

President of the United States

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2854 SPM/JTC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd mc/sc

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 pmd REASON FOR EXTENSION FOIM, II, 1-2.4.2. DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91 9-15-81

August 13, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR

Attached hereto is a memorandum containing a Bureau analysis of the really productive, worthwhile Confidential National Defense Informants throughout the Field. It will be noted that there is a total of 67 informants falling within this category.

The total of 67 productive informants reflects an increase of 14 such informants since the preparation of the memorandum dated July 19, 1941. This increase is due first to information, furnished by certain Special Agents in Charge, to the effect that the earlier memorandum failed to reflect the names of certain persons whom they consider as truly productive key informants in their division. In addition, there is included in this memorandum the names of paid informants developed since the preparation of the memorandum dated July 19, 1941.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

By way of recapitulation there is set out for your convenience and information hereinafter a tabulation of these informants, together with their names by Field Office, listed as to the type of information being furnished by them. Additional background and personal information concerning each informant mentioned is set forth in the attached memorandum.

ALBANY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1 Wylie B. Goodrich
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2 Raymond Bennett Gates
Alma Hill Jackson
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

BALTIMORE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0

INDEXED RECORDED
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
8 SEP 25 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

BALTIMORE FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

BIRMINGHAM FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

BOSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	1
	Japanese activities:	0

BUFFALO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

BUTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

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CHARLOTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

CHICAGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	1
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

CINCINNATI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CINCINNATI FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CLEVELAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

DALLAS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

DENVER FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

DES MOINES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

DETROIT FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

EL PASO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRAND RAPIDS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	1
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	1

HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

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HUNTINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

INDIANAPOLIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	1
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

JACKSON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

JUNEAU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

KANSAS CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

KNOXVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

LITTLE ROCK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	1
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	1

LOUISVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	1
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	1
	Japanese activities:	0

MEMPHIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

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CONFIDENTIAL

MIAMI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2

German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

MILWAUKEE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

NEWARK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

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b7C
b7D

NEW HAVEN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1

Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 3

NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on German activities: 4

Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 1

OKLAHOMA CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

OMAHA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

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PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 0

PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

PITTSBURGH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2

German activities: 2

Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CONFIDENTIAL

PORTLAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

RICHMOND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

SAINT LOUIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	[redacted]
German activities:	1	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

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b7D

SAINT PAUL FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

(U)

SALT LAKE CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

SAN ANTONIO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	[redacted]
German activities:	2	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CONFIDENTIAL

SAN DIEGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	4
	German activities:	2
	Italian activities:	1
	Japanese activities:	2

SAN JUAN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

SAVANNAH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	2
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	1

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b7C
b7D

SIOUX FALLS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

SPRINGFIELD FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	0
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on	Communist activities:	0
	German activities:	1
	Italian activities:	0
	Japanese activities:	0

b6
b7C
b7D

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-10-2013
F65M72K70

JTM:vmc

August 13, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR

There is herein set forth a list of Confidential National Defense Informants who can be considered as key informants in the particular Field Divisions wherein they are situated.

[redacted]

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b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tam
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

b6
b7C
b7D

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED PDB:RIB
66-2542-3-76

October 1, 1941

Mr. Arnold D. Ritchey
2144 Sugar Grove
Indianapolis, Indiana

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 PMD/mc
JC

Dear Mr. Ritchey:

Please be advised that your letter dated September 17, 1941, directed to Mr. Stephen Early, Secretary to the President of the United States, has been referred to this Bureau.

Your courtesy and interest in bringing this matter to the attention of the Federal Government are indeed appreciated. Should you feel that you possess information which you believe would be of interest to this Bureau, it is suggested that you communicate directly with Mr. S. J. Drayton, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, 323 Federal Building, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

cc - Indianapolis (with cc of incoming)

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ OCT 1 1941 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Newark, New Jersey

September 25, 1941.

EDD:MH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 PMW/mcj JC

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Special Agent (A) EUGENE D. DIXON has called to my attention a suggestion which could be of value to the Bureau in connection with its National Defense investigations.

He has advised me that he had a talk with Miss MARY CHILDS NERNEY, Reference Librarian of the Business Branch of the Public Library located on Commerce Street, Newark, New Jersey. The results of their conversation are as follows:

Miss NERNEY stated that their library, together with other business libraries, has a world of information concerning the United States, some of which she feels would be most valuable to a person bent on subversive activities. Included in these libraries are data concerning Army and Navy contracts, details concerning plants in the United States, where they are located, and general information concerning their manufacturing ability. She advised Special Agent DIXON that often times suspicious persons come into the library and ask for information of this type. She feels that some of these people are not gathering this information to further their education because they do not appear to be the intellectual type. In that connection, she felt that the Bureau should be informed of these requests, which information should at least be a matter of record with the Bureau.

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EX-8 RECORDED

66-2542-3-78

Miss NERNEY advised that the libraries could take the names and addresses of all persons desiring information of a particular type or special arrangements could be worked out whereby the names and addresses of persons using a particular kind of service could be obtained. Miss NERNEY stated that in the event this might not be desirable the names and addresses of

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
4 SEP 29 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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R. 582 JUL 19 1961

Confidential in General intell - Genl

all persons using the library could be obtained on a large register with appropriate notations by the librarian as to the kind of information requested by each individual. She advised that some of the libraries do use a register and it could be installed in all libraries without any difficulty.

In the case of an explosion in some plant where there are no suspects, these lists maintained by the libraries might be very helpful to the Bureau in furnishing the names of all persons who have done considerable reading on explosives. Investigations of these persons might possibly lead to the individual who caused the explosion. It is believed that there are possibly other instances where these lists maintained by the libraries would prove to be very helpful to the Bureau.

Miss NERNEY stated that she felt that if the Bureau would explain the situation to all libraries and request that they do what has been set forth in this letter that they would be more than glad to do so. Miss NERNEY furnished a list of all the Business Libraries in the United States, which are as follows:

California

Los Angeles	Public Library, Science and Industry Department, 530 S. Hope Street.
San Diego	Public Library, Business and Technology Department - across the street from the Central Building
San Francisco	Public Library, Business Branch, 629 Russ Building.

Connecticut

Hartford	Business Branch of Public Library, 730 Main Street
Waterbury	Silas Bunson Library, Business and Industrial Department in the Central Building.

Illinois

Peoria	Business Department of Public Library in the Central Building

Indiana	
Indianapolis	Business Branch of Public Library, Ohio and Meridan Streets.
South Bend	Business and Industrial Department of Public Library located in building at rear of the Central Library lot.
Maryland	
Baltimore	Enoch Pratt Free Library, Business and Economics Department, located in Central Library.
Massachusetts	
Boston	Public Library, Kirstein Business Branch, 20 City Hall Avenue
Minnesota	
Minneapolis	Public Library, Business and Municipal Branch, 508 Second Avenue, South
New Jersey	
Newark	Business Branch, 34 Commerce Street
Trenton	Free Public Library, Business and Technical Department, Central Library on Academy Street.
New York	
New York City	Economics Division, 5th Avenue and 42nd St.
Rochester	Business and Economics Division in Central Library Building, 115 South Avenue
Albany	John L. Pryn Library, 137 No. Pearl

Ohio	
Cleveland	Business Information Bureau in Central Library, 325 Superior Avenue.
Pennsylvania	
Pittsburgh	Carnegia Library of Pittsburgh, Business District Branch, 247 Union Trust Building
Rhode Island	
Providence	Business Branch of the Library on the mezzanine of the Chamber of Commerce Building
Tennessee	
Nashville	Public Library, Business Branch in reference department of the Central Library.

Although it is felt that some of the requests of these libraries would be legitimate, it is believed that the Bureau might desire to direct the field offices covering the cities in which these libraries are located to make some arrangements with the libraries whereby they would maintain a register of persons desiring information which might be considered highly technical and of a vital nature. These registers may prove valuable to the Bureau in investigations of espionage and sabotage.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Conroy jm

E. E. CONROY
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

DML:CSH October 2, 1941

MR. TAMM

I communicated with Mr. Foxworth in New York with reference to the attached letter from "Neil", and suggested that he have Mr. Guerin contact "Don-the-Beachcomber" in an effort to enlist his aid in furnishing information which may come to his attention on his trips through Central and South America, et cetera.

Respectfully,

D. M. Ladd

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp6 Eja/Sgs ON 4-22-94 83-1343

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PMD/MC/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, N. 1-2 3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-91 7-13-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ORIGINAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nicholson
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hoden
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

ENCL.

RECORDED 66-2542-3-79

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 4 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TAMM HOLLOWAY

4 FEB 12 1942

Initials on Original

CONFIDENTIAL

Thanks for [illegible] Chicago; picked it up last ni[illegible] passing through Neil

C
O
P
Y go

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 PMD/mc/J

Aboard Portland Rose
Spetember 25, 1941

51784

Dear Edgar:-

I understand that a boat called 'The Hermes', which anchors near the Floyd Bennett airport in Sheepshead (?) Bay, is manned by three lads who profess and boast of their German nationality. They are said to work in a bar in the Wall St district in the daytime. One of them told a friend of mine the other day that the USA was stupid, and people did'nt pay enough attention to what was going on inside the country. He said at night he often put-putted up the Lower Bay of New York, chatted with merchantmen at anchor there, learned their departure date and any other information he desired. He said that soldiers on Governor's Island told him 'Plenty'.

I found a letter in Chicago from Pauline Goosens saying she was beginning work at the French Embassy again - last Thursday; and is living at 2129 Wyoming Ave. Shall keep the 'contact' open with postcards and an occassional letter, in case you need any information from there that you can't secure otherwise.

Incidentally Don-the-Beachcomber (whose name has now been legalized as that!) will be at the Pierre in New York Sunday Sept 28 for a day or two. He leaves shortly for Tahiti, the Marquessas, Rairati via Suva and Manzanillo on some of his own and Matson SS Co business. I have known him 10 years rather well and never have found him wanting. Am sure he might find out some very good information for you - so why don't you contact him. He suggested to me he'd like to contact ONI, and I told him I'd get in touch with 'my people in Washington' instead. I think he thought I meant the White House; so would be surprised at nothing. He is the originator of the Beachcomber Bar in Hollywood; the Beachcomber in Chicago, in Honolulu, in Tahiti, and Trader Vicks in Oakland, Calif, I believe; and has just won a suit against Monte Prosser in Ny, etc for taking his trade name. You will like him immensely, and as far as I know he is perfectly honorable, a great admirer of FD's, and his information should prove valuable.

RECORDED
66-2542
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 1 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The further west I go the more doubtful I become over lecturing this year. It seems to me I may be putting my neck way out, what with all this Isolationist section of the country where Lindbergh, Wheeler, Nye etc go so well.

Initials on original

I may run over to Reno for Saturday and Sunday instead of Sun Valley as Paul writes me there is renewed activity in Donner Pass, and of a rather conclusively nasty nature. Will keep in touch by wire.

Yours always,

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

CC-161

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

LBN:WGR

September 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

Re: Harry Brooks

By reference of Mr. Felix Blair, in charge of the Washington office of Time Magazine, I talked to Harry Brooks, with whom Mr. Blair has a slight acquaintance. Brooks is a man approximately 40 years of age, who has the equivalent of a college degree, he left Russia during the Bolshevik revolution in 1920, attended Robert's College, Constantinople, then went to France. He speaks Russian, French, and German, fluently. He is a bitter anti-Communist and is very bitter against Germany. At the present time he is employed on the NBC listening stations in Long Island.

This individual makes a very good appearance, he handles himself exceptionally well and he stated that he would like to cooperate with the Bureau in any possible way and would also like to secure a position if it were possible. He does not have his citizenship papers for which reason I told him that we could not give him a permanent appointment and it was not necessary to even consider this.

The thought, however, occurs that this individual might develop into a good contact and might be used by the New York office. Accordingly, I gave him an application blank and told him to fill it out and also told him to see Mr. Connelley in the New York office sometime at his convenience.

Respectfully,

L. B. Nichols

CH-13

RECORDED
INDEXED
EX-16

66-2542 3-79X

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 DMW/mc/JC

TOLSON FOXWORTH THREE FIVE

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o
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y gmh

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.
September 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: RAYMOND H. WILLIAMS
In-Service Training
School 8/24/41 -
9/7/41.

* *

(E X C E R P T)

He offered two suggestions which are attached hereto.

S. J. Tracy.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mcj

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Copy mpls - Trial Mtg

De-indexed this serial only 39
10/27/58

TONE I

RECORDED
~~INDEXED~~

66-2542-3-7941
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 30 1941 A. M.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON CLEGG THREE FIVE

CH-18

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 8

EX - 3

c
o
p
y gmh

Raymond H. Williams
In-Service Training
School 8/25/41 - 9/7/41

SUGGESTIONS

#1

While in the Re raining School, Special Agent Williams stated that some of the supervisors, i. e. those handling such lectures as the Registration Act and Voorhis Act, quote at considerable length from Statutes. As a request, it is necessary that extended notes be taken. In view of the fact that the time of the lectures is rather short, he suggests that those supervisors who discuss Statutes in detail and quote either portions or all of the Statute, have available mimeographed outlines setting forth the provisions of the Statute in order in which they are discussed; that this will save the time of the Agents taking ntes and will enable the class to cover more ground than is presently possible.

#2

Special Agent Williams stated that the matter of confidential informants was discussed during the Retraining Class and that the questions arose as to the mass production of informants in the field. He stated that a mojority of those in the class seemed to feel that producing a specified number of informants within a specified definite time does not produce the best results; that, for example, if an Agent is given an assignment to produce twenty informant in so-many days, the quality of the informants will not be sufficiently good and that he believes it would be better for fewer informants to be developed and develop these informants to a higher degree and handle them in greater detail.

Agent Williams was advised that his suggestion would be considered by the Burea.

st

ORIGINAL FILED IN

66-2542-3-7921

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
October 7, 1941

GCC:HMW:MM

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

There is attached hereto for your approval a proposed letter to all SAC's instructing them in the procedure to be followed by the field concerning the handling of paid confidential informants.

Respectfully,

R. H. Cunningham

R. H. Cunningham

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 PHW/mc/JC

RECORDED 66-2542-3-80

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2 OCT 21 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LADD
TAMM

Conf. Mgt - Genl. Intell - Work - Genl

187

RECORDED

INDEXED

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) ON
DATE 10/6/81

Declass FL

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

October 17, 1941

SAC ALBANY
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
DALLAS
DENVER
DES MOINES
DETROIT
EL PASO
GRAND RAPIDS
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
HUNTINGTON
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JUNEAU
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE
MEMPHIS
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
PROVIDENCE
RICHMOND
ST. LOUIS
ST. PAUL
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SIOUX FALLS
SPRINGFIELD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
QUANTICO

DECLASSIFIED BY 2847 DMD/MCW
ON 7-13-81

Dear Sir:

Your attention is directed to the provisions of Bureau Bulletin No. 17, First Series, dated May 15, 1941, which, under Section J details the steps to be taken concerning the development of Confidential National Defense Informants.

It is noted that on page 27 of this bulletin it is stated that in the event payments to confidential informants exceed $2.50 per week or $10 per month, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. The provisions of this bulletin must be observed.

The Bureau desires that in those instances where the Field has been authorized to pay an informant for a definite period of time, it will be necessary for each Special Agent in Charge to advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued. It will be necessary for the Special Agent in Charge to make a definite recommendation as to the rate of pay and at the same time to furnish the Bureau with a synopsis of the information which the informant has developed during the time he has been working for the Bureau. There have been numerous instances where Field Offices have been authorized to pay informants for certain designated periods of time and have continued payments to them long after the time has expired. This practice must be discontinued.

It is to be emphasized that the Bureau is very desirous of obtaining confidential informants in National Defense matters and, of

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R 582 JUL 25 1961

course, it is the duty of the Special Agents in Charge to evaluate the services of every informant and to recommend the amount of remuneration therefor. In order that the Bureau's records may be accurate, however, it is necessary that the above-mentioned procedure be followed in all cases.

Very truly yours,

J. Ed. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECORDED

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
TRACY
CARSON
COFFEY
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 DMW/MCL
ON 7-13-81

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COMMUNICATIONS
OCT 17 1941
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 18 1961

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Very truly yours,

J. Ed. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

AIR MAIL

Bogota, Colombia
October 15, 1941.

Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

As of possible interest to the Bureau, one Confidential Informant, [redacted] advised that the following individuals are reliable anti-Nazis in the United States.

[redacted] Austrian, age about [redacted] son of a well-known [redacted] Parents and one brother living in England. Address c/o Bethany College, West Virginia.

[redacted] Austrian, age about [redacted] Volunteered for the U.S. Army. Parents in England. Address: Fort Worth, Texas.

[redacted] Austrian, age about [redacted] Parents reside in England. His sister is married to one Lord Yeans, famous British astronomer. Address: 155 Summit Avenue, Mount Vernon, N.Y.

If, for any reason, the Bureau desires to contact each or any of the above named persons it will be entirely satisfactory if Informant [redacted] name is used.

Information relative to [redacted] is contained in my letter dated September 9, 1941, Bogota, Communication # 383.

Yours very truly,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-14-81 BY X S.I.S. # 64
2842 DMD/MC/JC

Communication # 441

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-08-2013
F65M72K70

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classified
DATE 10/1/87

PJW:AJ

October 24, 1941

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 PMW/JMC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 3
FCIM, II, 1-2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-81
7-13-87

Special Agent in Charge
New York, New York

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS;
ESPIONAGE - I.

Dear Sir:

The Bureau has observed that the offices receiving copies of this letter appear to be the focal points of Italian activities in the United States. Despite the number of espionage investigations of this character which have been initiated, very little information, for the most part, has been developed to indicate the modus operandi of Italian agents operating in the United States and their means of communication. These investigations have failed to produce evidence to corroborate or substantiate the allegations of espionage activities on the part of individuals who allegedly are members of the Italian secret police. This deplorable situation undoubtedly is the result of the lack of confidential informants and the evident failure on the part of Special Agents in Charge to seek and develop the services of individuals who are familiar with, or in a position whereby they could obtain, information regarding actual espionage activities on the part of Italian agents.

It is generally conceded that one of the best means of obtaining such information is through the employment of confidential informants conversant with Italian activities. In this connection, the Bureau desires that each field office receiving copies of this communication transmit to the Bureau a list of those confidential informants who have been developed by your respective office and who have been or are furnishing your office with information which definitely indicates that individuals within your respective field division are obtaining and/or transmitting information to Italy or other foreign governments pertaining to the national defense of the United States.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Hoffman
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RECORDED 66-2542-3-82
INDEXED 66-2542-3-82
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
NOV 1 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-82

CONFIDENTIAL

You are also requested to advise the Bureau as to the specific plan or procedure which you have taken or are pursuing to develop informants who may have access to information dealing with espionage activities of Italian agents.

You are instructed to transmit the requested information to the Bureau not later than October 31, 1941.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc Seattle
Portland
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Diego
New Orleans
Philadelphia
Boston
Chicago
Buffalo
Newark
Miami

CONFIDENTIAL

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

CONFIDENTIAL

PEF:MT

New York, N. Y.
October 29, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6bja/bjs
ON 4-23-94
83-1343

Attention: Mr. D. M. Ladd

Dear Sir:

Confirming my several telephone conversations with Mr. Ladd, this is to advise that upon receipt of the Bureau's instructions for Mr. Guerin to contact Don the Beachcomber, in Guerin's absence I spoke to Don the Beachcomber with reference to his proposed trip to Tahiti, telling him that he had been referred to us by Cornelius Vanderbilt. He stated "Neil had probably had several too many rum collins", further relating that he was going to Tahiti some time during the latter part of 1941 for a short business trip and that he would be very glad to be of any assistance possible at that time. He further advised that he owned night clubs in Los Angeles and Chicago, and was in New York for a brief business visit. (U)

During the conversation I indicated that he might be of value through furnishing us information locally as well as concerning his visit to Tahiti. He stated he would be glad to do this, and immediately upon his return to the Los Angeles office he would contact Special Agent in Charge R. B. Hood. (U)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 DMD/MC/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-91
7-13-81

Very truly yours,

P. E. Foxworth

P. E. FOXWORTH
Assistant Director.

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66-2542-3-83

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2 OCT 31 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONF. INFTs. in general intelligence matter

CH-22

EX-16

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EAT:GEG

October 9, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ellis
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

I advised Mr. Bugas that you had recently received word indicating that the Detroit Office was depending too much on [redacted] for information concerning subversive activities and was asking [redacted] to evaluate information received from other sources relating to subversive activities. Mr. Bugas stated that this is not true and that, as a matter of fact, no Agent of the Detroit Office other than Bugas has contacted [redacted] in the past two years. Bugas states that he makes a practice of contacting [redacted] about once every three months merely for the purpose of keeping his contact with him alive. He states that [redacted] has no information concerning subversive activities and is of no use to the office as a source of this type of information.

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b7C
b7D

Bugas advised, in confidence, of course, that he has two confidential informants who work for [redacted] and that whenever he wants anything from the Ford organization he obtains it from these informants. One of these sources of information is a man named [redacted]. The other is an informant named [redacted] who is the [redacted] of a unit of the Young Communist League and who works in the Ford plant. Bugas states that [redacted] does not know of the office contact with either of these two men.

Mr. Bugas states that he has not at any time furnished any information to [redacted] and that he does not check any information with him.

Respectfully,

Edward A. Tamm

RECORDED
INDEXED

66-2542-3-84

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 OCT 24 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TOLSON
OLEGG
NICHOLS

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mcl

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EX-1

CC-150

GCC:MK

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OCTOBER 31, 1941

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to:

BOSTON
BUFFALO
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CLEVELAND
DETROIT
EL PASO
JACKSON
MIAMI
NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
SAN ANTONIO

74391

SUBMIT IMMEDIATELY PROGRESS REPORT AMSD CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS AS OF OCTOBER TWENTIETH.

HOOVER

RECORDED

66-2542-3-85

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
NOV 6 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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Initialed in Director's Office

OCT 31 1941
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R 582 JUN 19 1951

IT VIA _____ 5 M Per _____